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BAD BOYS, BAD MEN, AND BAD CASE LAW:
RE-EXAMINING THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
NO-DUTY-TO-RESCUE RULES

PETER F. LAKE*
Modem no-duty-to-rescue rules1 are linked to the past,2 particularly
to a perceived laissez-faire period 3 of Anglo-American jurisprudencethe late 1800s and early 1900s. 4 The past, however, is flawed in two very
prominent ways. First, most of the historical no-duty-to-rescue cases
have been overruled, discredited, superceded, or removed to new legal
categories other than duty rules.5 Second, the historical cases have been
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law
School; A.B. 1981, Harvard University. Once again I am indebted to my research assistants, Drake Buckman and Lynn Holdsworth. Additionally, the idea for this article grew
in substantial part out of several conversations with Mary Chapman. I would also like to
thank Erin Fisher for helpful comments.
1. For bar exam purposes, one would say that there is no general non-statutory
duty to rescue unless there is some special relationship present. See Peter F. Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 315,
316 nn.1 & 6 (1997). While not precisely accurate, nor technically complete, see id. at
316 n.6, even prominent justices will be heard stating equivalent rules. See Jackson v.
City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., stating a no duty to rescue
rule in the broadest terms: "Now there is of course no general common law duty to rescue
a stranger indistress even if the rescue can be accomplished at no cost to the rescuer.").
2. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance ofRemoteness to the Duty to Rescue, supra note 1, at 316; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
3. See Schacht v. The Queen [1972] 30 D.L.R. 3d 641, 651 (Can.) ("[F]rom the legal standpoint the laissez-faire attitude of the priest and the Levite was condoned.").
4. See, e.g., Don M. Reckseen, Note, The Duty to Rescue, 47 IND. L. J. 321, 321 &
nn.l-5 (1972). The Restatement (Second) of Torts states its no-duty-to-aid rule in section
314. The Reporter's notes provide support for the general rule of section 314 with several
cases, most of which were decided in this period. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314 reporter's notes (1965).
5. In a previous article I noted that when historical cases spoke of"no duty" to rescue, they really meant, as was common in periods prior to 1960, "no liability" for failure
to rescue. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue,
supra note 1, at 319-29. Today, courts typically distinguish "no duty" arguments from
other prima facie and affirmative defense liability limiting tools, such as causation and
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greatly overgeneralized. The majority of the historical no-duty-to-aid
cases arose when boys (although not very young boys)6 did bad things
(such as by trespassing), or when men behaved in foolish ways (such as
by canoeing on an icy lake after drinking heavily), or when men 7 did
foolish things at work (or worked with foolish or inattentive co-workers).
Historical no-duty-to-rescue rules were largely developed from situations
involving certain forms of socially unproductive,8 even foolhardy, behavior exhibited by (often young) males 9 and men misbehaving at work."'
Most of these historical cases are no longer good law.
Situations involving males behaving badly, thus, shaped the historical cases and became bad law. These cases made things difficult for socially responsible males and almost all females. Modem courts have
assumption of risk. See Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent
Consolidation of a Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New
Conservative Liability Limiting Use of Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV.

1503 (1997).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (c), (d) (1965) (stating that very
young boys sometimes become beneficiaries of a rule ameliorating the "no duty" rule,
e.g., attractive nuisance doctrine).
7. Prior to workers' compensation, the workplace was largely a no-duty zone, due
in part to policy goals that were not merely miscreant-male-oriented. When women or
girls entered the workplace, they were often treated as badly as men and boys. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Hixson, 36 S.E. 810, 810 (Ga. 1900) (no duty to aid a woman who worked in a
laundry who became trapped in a roller press machine).
8. In some instances, even though the behavior itself was socially unproductive,
the costs to prevent that behavior were well out of proportion to any reasonable prevention of risks. See, e.g., Kravetz v. Perini & Sons, 252 F.2d 905, 909 (3d Cir. 1958); Powell v. Ligon, 5 A.2d 373, 376 (Pa. 1939) (in both cases, holding that the cost of fencing in
a large area of land outweighed the risk of danger).
9. Even today young men and boys are significantly greater risk generators. For
example, American automobile insurance rates are typically gender and age sensitive,
with young males typically paying the highest rates outside of assigned risk pools. Moreover, drunk driving incidents are overwhelmingly caused by men. See Jessica DeBianchi,
Don't ForgetInsurance; Type of Vehicle, Your Age, Gender, Record Are Factors, SUNSENntNAL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 14, 1998, at 16.
10. Workers' compensation laws cover the majority of workplace injuries. Today,
we tend to experience bad employee behavior through, in part, workers' compensation
insurance crises.
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overlooked the fact that a particular subset of males and their behavior
largely created "rescue" doctrine. In an incredible twist of irony, the historical cases have actually been used to protect some socially unproductive behavior and to deny protection for many individuals who behaved
in socially productive or responsible manners. 1
Today, when modem courts look for support for no-duty-to-rescue
rules, they should put the historical cases in proper perspective. Those
cases teach some important lessons about socially unproductive behavior
and tort law, but they suffer badly from overuse, misconception, and
over-generalization. Using these cases as a way to avoid dealing with
modem affirmative duty problems is inappropriate.
I.

ISBEHAVING BOYS UNDER COMMON LAW

Misbehaving boys like to trespass and play with unreasonably dangerous things. The common law was reluctant to protect such behavior
unless the boys were very young, and even then, not always. 12 Of the
sixteen cases cited by the reporter in support of Restatement (Second) of
C. & S.
Torts, section 314,13 two illustrate this
15 reluctancy-Riley v. Gulf,
F. Ry. Co. 14 and Sidwell v. McVay.
In Riley, plaintiffs son, Oscar, had his foot amputated following an
accident involving a train. 16 Oscar was attempting to board a freight train

11. Thus, in a recent decision, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled (contrary to most
courts) that a psychotherapist owed no duty to warn a woman of an imminent threat of
violence to her. See Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E. 2d 502, 502 (Va. 1995); see also Peter F.
Lake, VirginiaIs Not Safe for "Lovers": The Virginia Supreme Court Rejects Tarasoff,
in Nasser v. Parker, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1285, 1289-91 (1995) (stating that the Nasser
court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts' no-duty-to-rescue rules to protect psychotherapists from liability for their socially unproductive behavior-failing to give a simple
warning that would save lives and refusing to protect blameless women victims).
12. See infranote 56.
13. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
14. 160 S.W. 595 (Tex. 1913).
15. 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955).
16. See Riley, 160 S.W. at 595.
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en route to Texas when "his foot was mashed and broken."'17 After Oscar
suffered the injury, he sent a friend to get a doctor.1 8 The train personnel
detained Oscar's friend, however, causing a delay in his receiving aid. 19
Once the doctor arrived, train personnel directed the doctor to give Oscar
only minimal care, preferring instead to get him to the hospital. 20 Presumably, if the doctor had done more, the foot might have been saved. 2'
The court viewed Oscar as a trespasser who in, attempting to thieve a
ride, was owed no duty by the railroad. 22
Although Riley would be suspect as a no-duty case today,23 Riley
represents a classic misbehaving male scenario. Misbehaving boys-old
enough to appreciate the risks and consequences of their behavior-try to
cop a ride on a train, injure themselves, and then expect someone to
compensate them for their injuries. Moreover, in Riley it is not entirely
clear that the train personnel were callous or unreasonable. 24 The initial
delay could have been due to a desire to sort out the story of a trespasser,
and the directions to the doctor may have been reasonable.25
Sidwell involved a sixteen-year-old boy who blew his hand off while

17.

Id.

18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.at 596-97.
23. The train employees were considered to be acting outside the scope of employment. See id. at 597. Today's broader notions of scope of employment would no
doubt encompass their actions. See, e.g., Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1281
(N.Y. 1979) (an employee's scope of employment includes doing the master's work or
furthering some purpose of the master). The actions of the railroad employees in Riley
were in the nature of interfering with the rescue of another or taking charge or control of
an injured person, which today would trigger potential liability. See, e.g., Jackson v. City

of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1983); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 323, 324, 327 (1965).

24. See Riley, 160 S.W. at 595.
25. For example, had the railroad directed or permitted the doctor to treat the foot,
and if the evidence had tended also to show that hospitalization would have been more
effective, the railroad might have been sued for those reasons.
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attempting to construct a pipe bomb.2 6 Sidwell and his friends bought
firecrackers, from which they extracted significant quantities of
gunpowder.27 They intended to build a pipe bomb as they had done on
previous occasions. 28 To put the finishing touches on the pipe bomb,
Sidwell repeatedly beat the pipe with a hammer. 29 The other boys-in
fear for their own well-being-moved away to safety.30 Sidwell continued to hammer away until the bomb exploded; luckily, the explosion did
not kill him.3 ' After the explosion, Sidwell sued his friends and the par32
ents of one friend, on whose property the Fourth of July injury occurred.33
Sidwell's principal argument was that as land owners and operators,
the defendants were duty-bound to eject him or to warn him of the dangers of his actions.3 4 Interestingly, Sidwell was deemed to have "an alert
mind" and had specific experience with pipe bombs. 35 Moreover, his
friends claimed they did warn him.36
The Sidwell court recognized that Sidwell's arguments invoked, albeit improperly, the doctrine of attractive nuisance.37 Sidwell was old
enough to know of the danger, and he brought the danger onto the prem-

26. See Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756, 758 (Okla. 1955).
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
monished

See id.

See id.
See id.
See id.

See id. The parents had seen the boys with the gunpowder, and the father adthe boy about the pipe bomb. See id.
32. Fourth of July is a favorite miscreant-male day. A man created havoc (both in
fact and doctrinally) on the Fourth of July when transporting explosives in an unmarked
package. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also
Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (Mass. 1928) (An intoxicated man drowned after
falling out of a rental canoe.).
33. See Sidwell, 282 P.2d at 757.

34.
35.
36.
37.

See id. at 758.
See id.
See id. at 758-59.
See id. at 758.
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ises himself.38 The defendants, therefore, owed no affirmative duty to
eject him or warn him of the danger he was creating.39

Although the court rested its decision on no-duty grounds, 40 it could
have decided the case on breach, causation, 41 or affirmative defense

grounds. 42 Today, most jurisdictions treat invited social guests like Sidwell as invitees or as someone owed a duty of reasonable care. 43 In those
states, Sidwell would have lost on these other non-duty grounds, unless
the court applied something analogous to an "open and obvious danger"
no-duty rule to Sidwell-like situations. 44 In this sense, Sidwell's no-duty
rationale has been effectively superceded by modem concepts of tort liability; however, the no-liability result is still one that most courts would
and should reach on these facts-even as a matter of law.
A famous case, not relied on by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,

38. See id.
39. See id. at 758-59. As to the friends who allegedly stood by, the court also refused to impose a duty to warn or assist, citing a general no-duty-to-aid rule. See id. at
759. That rationale was strained, given that there was testimony that the boys were engaged in a common undertaking and had all participated in active misconduct that increased the risk of harm to Sidwell and themselves. See id. at 758. Thus, the matter was
not one of affirmative duty alone. However, the court noted a more convincing rationale-no breach of duty. See id. at 759. The court stated that the boys claimed they tried to
stop Sidwell from hammering away. See id. The court also noted Sidwell's defiance of
his friends' warnings against him and held that there was no proof of affirmative misconduct. See id.
40. See id.at 758-59.
41. In the 1950s, it would not have been uncommon to view Sidwell, a deliberate
actor, as the sole proximate cause of his own harm. See id.; see also Yania v. Bigan, 155
A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that the decedent was the sole proximate cause of his
death even though he was induced to enter into certain acts by the proprietor).
42. In the 1950s, plaintiffs typically faced all-or-nothing affirmative defenses,
clearly applicable here, of assumed risk and contributory negligence. See Sidwell, 282
P.2d at 759; Yania, 155 A.2d at 344.
43. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue,
supra note 1, at 316.
44. See Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 969 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the duty
owed by one participant to a co-participant in a sporting event-in this case a horse
race-is a duty to merely avoid reckless or intentionally harmful conduct).
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presents the same type of misbehaving male problem. In Buch v. Amory
46
Manufacturing Co.,45 an eight-year-old boy trespassed into a factory.
His presence was known to the plant employees. 7 Soon after the boy
entered, a piece of machinery caught his arm. 48 The Buch court refused
to impose a duty to remove or warn the boy. 49 In fact, the court believed
50
the boy might owe money to the business for trespassing damages.
Today, Buch stands as bad law on its own. Overruled in substantial
measure in its own jurisdiction, 51 a Buch result would be inappropriate in
American jurisdictions today. 2
It does reflect, however, the potency of fact patterns involving miscreant
young males; it also reflects then extant paradigms of no liabil3
ity.

II. YOUNG MISBEHAVING BOYSTHE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DocTRINE
In the mid-to-late 1800s and early 1900s, miscreant boys were considered bad at almost any age and were barred from recovery, as they
were in Buch.54 As late as 1922, the United States Supreme Court echoed
45. 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897), overruled in part by Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d

631 (N.H. 1976).
46. See id. at 809.
47. Seeid. at810.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631 (N.H. 1976).
52. Buch involved injury arising from an instrumentality under the control of the
defendant, triggering RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 322 (1977) responsibility. In
addition, some duty was owed to this type of trespasser (particularly a child trespasser).

See id.
53. The injured boy in Buch came onto the premises probably in pursuit of a job or
future job prospect. Had he been an employee, he might have fared little better than a
"trespasser." See Buch, 44 A. at 811.
54. See Leon Green, Landowners' Responsibility to Children, 27 TEX. L. REV. 1

(1948).
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the sentiment that trespassing boys are not entitled to relief 55 Because
trespassing was a prominent source of injuries for miscreant boys, the
courts faced a number of scenarios, 56 some of which were particularly
unpalatable as no-duty cases. 5 Thus, in the late 1800s courts began to
draft an important exception to no-duty-to-aid-or-rescue rules-the attractive nuisance doctrine.5 8
Implicitly, most courts in that formative period concluded that protecting against all trespassing boys, and the injuries that they caused
themselves, would be socially undesirable. However, when a person
knew a very young child-one too young to appreciate the dangermight be hurt by something that could have easily been made safe, it was

hard to justify the no-liability results typically applicable to minor, nonteenage boys. 5 9 In the late nineteenth century, the so-called "turntable
55. See United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 276 (1922) (no duty
owed to trespassing children).
56. There is little to suggest that the "historical" courts placed as much emphasis
on misfeasance/nonfeasance as they do today. See Lake, Recognizing the Importanceof
Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, supra note 1, at 319-29. For the most part, the emphasis was on the misconduct of the plaintiff/miscreant and the burden on the defendant, as
opposed to questions as to whether the plaintiff requested protection from affirmative
conduct of some unintentional kind or to be extricated from a place of danger. Cf.Buch,
44 A. at 809. (A young boy was injured in active, non-natural operations of a defendant,
yet the court placed heavy emphasis on the distinction between preventing and causing an
injury.) The common law courts of the historical period saw little practical difference
between the claim, "Help me, my arm is stuck in your machine" and "protect me from
encountering your machine."
57. See JoHNL. DiAMONDETAL., UNDEPSTANDNG TORTS § 9.02, at 141 (1996).
58. It is more common today to consider attractive nuisance rules in the context of
landowner duties, particularly in light of an exception to duties owed to trespassers. See
id. at 138-42. Appropriate as that is, the attractive nuisance doctrine draws its roots to the
period in which courts generally denied virtually all legal responsibility for bad boys,
men behaving badly, and people at work. The attractive nuisance doctrine was a limited
amelioration of a general no-liability approach, much as the last clear chance doctrine
operated to ameliorate the harsh effects of the doctrine of contributory negligence. Most
bad boys were out of luck; a few special bad boys could claim the status of child trespasser subject to attractive nuisance rules and were able to gain recovery.
59. Similarly, it was difficult to justify using the doctrine of contributory negligence against a now helpless plaintiff.
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doctrines" were born. 60 These cases involved very young children who
trespassed onto railroad yards and became mangled on railroad "turntables" that resembled, or were enticing as, carnival rides. 61 By the middle
of the twentieth century, courts had fully embraced the more expansive
attractive nuisance doctrine, described today in the oft-cited Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 339.62
Critically, the attractive nuisance doctrine created a duty to warn,
aid, or protect only young misbehaving boys. 63 The doctrine favored
landowners, however, when, inter alia, a child should have appreciated
the danger or when the burden to protect was too great in light of the

60. See DLAMONDETAL., supra note 57, § 9.02, at 141.
61. See id. at 143.
62. See, e.g., Szyplinski v. Midwest Mobile Home Supply Co., 241 N.W.2d 306,
308-09 (Minn. 1976) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts section 339 as reflecting a
rule previously adopted in Minnesota). Section 339 provides that:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the
land if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to
trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or
has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such
children, and (c) the children because of their youth do not discover
the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or
in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to
the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of
eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to
children involved, and (e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable
care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 339. Section 339 reflects the broadening of the turntable doctrines in at least two important ways. First, the attractive nuisance doctrine was
broadened to apply to situations outside the railroad turntable scenarios. Second, the requirement that that which lured a child to the premises must cause harm was relaxed. See
also DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 57, at 141-42.
63. See, e.g., King v. Lennen, 348 P.2d 98, 99 (Cal. 1959) (18-month-old child);
McWilliams v. Guzinski, 237 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1976) (four-year-old child).
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risks posed. 64 Thus, when older boys were injured by large, artificial wa-

ter conditions while they were trespassing, courts typically have remained cautious about imposing liability on landowners given that older
boys should appreciate the danger.65 As discussed in a comment to section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 66 courts confronting trespassing teenage boys near the age of sixteen who dive into shallow waters and become seriously injured have often rejected
liability to land67
liability.
such
allowed
cautiously
only
owners or
Often, misbehaving boys in need of protection or aid were deemed
trespassers. The common law development of the doctrine of attractive
nuisance was one method used to ameliorate the potentially harsh effects
of a no-duty/no-liability rule toward these boys. Attractive nuisance law
68
was an exception to no-affirmative-responsibility-to-aid decisions.
Very young misbehaving boys were sometimes owed a duty, including,
if reasonably necessary, a duty to rescue, aid, or protect; older misbehaving boys were much less likely to succeed on these theories. 69 Adult

64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (c), (d) (1965) ("As the age of the
child increases, conditions became fewer for which there can be recovery.").
65. See Hughes v. Quarve & Anderson Co., 338 N.W.2d 422, 424-25 (Minn.
1983).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmt. c (1965).
67. See, e.g., Hughes, 338 N.W.2d at 425. In Hughes a 16-year-old boy trespassed
into a quarry and dove headfirst into three feet of water, rendering him a quadriplegic.
See id. at 423. There was evidence that the water was murky and that the plaintiff was not
as mature as other 16-year-olds. See id. at 423, 425. In affirming a lower court's decision
to allow a jury to hear the case, Hughes noted that several cases had taken the view that
such a 16-year-old was an adult trespasser, to whom no special duty was owed. See id. at
425. However, the court also pointed to a number of cases where the maturity of 16-yearold (and younger) boys was not assumed. See id.
68. Obviously, the doctrine had broader implications than simply requiring one to
use reasonable care.
69. It is interesting to note that especially for teenagers, the decisional law is heavily weighted to bad boys and not trespassing girls. See Hughes, 338 N.W.2d at 425. Even
the attractive nuisance doctrine points to the special attention given to adolescent boys
and young men. Implicitly, the common law was reacting to a sense of disproportionate
risk creation. Today, one can see evidence in the case law that no-duty rules with respect
to older bad boys are being supplanted by comparative fault calculations. See id. (16-
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males consistently failed on claims made under these theories.
I.

LIABILITY ISSUES INVOLVING YOUNG COLLEGE MEN

Although few cases involve college-age men in classic duty-torescue scenarios, this century's development of liability law involving
college campuses has raised interesting problems for the affirmative duty
rule-the area where duty-to-rescue rules are thought to originate-and
misbehaving male youths. Some instructive insights into the miscreant
male problem can be gleaned from the evolution of cases involving collegiate men. College-aged men are often a problematic group, particularly when brought together.70 In war time, large groups of young boys
were often called armies, and a paternalistic, almost militaristic sentiment, pervaded collegiate cases prior to 1960. During this period, the
college was understood to stand in loco parentis for college studentsmost of whom were male rather than female and most of whom were
separated and segregated based on gender.71 In loco parentis put the
year-old boys who dive into a quarry were owed a duty, but subject to significant comparative fault offset). In the pre-comparative fault period it was easy to equate no duty
with no liability results. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty
to Rescue, supranote 1, at 329-33. After all, a 16-year-old who deliberately jumped into
a ditch could be, inter alia, an intervening cause or contributorily negligent. In either
instance, the historical result was no liability, and practically speaking, no duty. Moreover, in an era when "boys will be boys," a tricky responsibility issue arose. We might
not fault boys for being boys, but we might wish to make them learn responsibility for
their decisions. Thus, there is a difference between being responsible for breaking a lamp
and being responsible to take care of the new kitten you wish to adopt. For very young
boys, too young to be able to handle significant responsibility lessons, imposing the kitten type of responsibility might be unrealistic and unfair. Therefore, when four-year-old
Johnny wants a cat, he says he will take care of it. Unless you are an idiot or have a natural born concierge for a child, you know that you, the parent, will do most of the work, at
least for several years. Johnny is too young to take on that responsibility, and a principal
factor in deciding to keep the cat will be if it is too much of a burden on you, the parent.
70. See Tanja H. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991).
71. See Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, Reconceptualizing the University's
Duty to Provide a Safe Learning Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of ln Loco
Parentisand the Restatement (Second) of Torts,20 J.C. & U.L. 261, 263-67 (1994).
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college in the position
of being able to exercise its disciplinary power
72
with near impunity.
In particular, a college could make, enforce, and use almost any rule
and procedure deemed necessary.73 The legal powers conferred to a col74
lege were not so far from those depicted in the movie Animal House,
where Dean Wormer could make and enforce probationary rules (even
double secret probation) and summon a military-style honor council to
adjudicate matters. 75 In loco parentis doctrine was designed to provide a
college with the power to control students and their behavior;76 the doctrine was not applied to protect the physical security of the students, except possibly indirectly by protecting the college's right to discipline students.77
During the period of the in loco parentis doctrine, young men in college were subject to strict disciplinary powers. In fact, a right to control
supplanted duty (or non-duty) to aid and protect. The period of the in
loco parentis doctrine, however, came to an end in the 1960s and
1970s.78 The courts' initial reaction to colleges' loss of strict control over
student behavior often was to insulate the college from liability arising
from student (typically male) 79 misconduct, particularly where the misconduct which caused injury involved drinking. 80

72. See id. at 265.
73. See id.at 265-66.
74. AnMAL HOUSE (Universal Pictures 1978).
75. See, e.g., Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640 (Fla. 1924) (upholding the
power of a university to suspend/exclude students on the basis of allegedly vague rules
and in summary fashion).
76. See Bickel & Lake, supra note 71, at 265-66.
77. See id.at 266.
78. See id. at 266-70.
79. Female college students have become subject to fellow student rules and assumption of risk rules reminiscent of traditional workplace rules.
80. The classic cases on this point are: Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 144
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980) (college owed no duty to an 18-year-old
male who had been drinking with another young college male and who was involved in a
vehicular accident); Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 414 (Utah 1986) (univer-
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Curiously, courts began to create a doctrinal paradox: if a student
was injured by a non-student while on campus, that student was far more
likely to recover than if the student was injured by another student.8 1
The unmistakable image that courts had of the post-in loco parentis
campus was that of an alcohol-infused campus populated with uncontrollable underage drinkers, who injured themselves and others (on or off
campus), and who accepted these risks as part of college life. Bradshaw
v. Rawlings,8 2 decided in 1979, is the quintessential case. Bradshaw involved underage men who were drinking at an off-campus picnic and
caused a serious automobile accident. 83 The off-campus party was a
sophomore class party where almost everyone was underage and drinking. 84 The faculty were involved in the planning of the picnic. A faculty
advisor co-signed a check for funds that were later used to buy beer. The
Bradshaw court, however, mischaracterized 8 5 the case as one of (no) affirmative duty.86 Assuming that the only way to control student behavior
would be to impose "custodial" duties of care, 87 the Bradshaw court expressed a perceived futility in having anything less than Dean Wormerlike8 8 in loco parentisrules:
The centerpiece of Bradshaw's argument is that beer-

sity owed no duty to a 20-year-old female student injured while drinking on a field trip
after a fall into a crevice); Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (university owed no duty to a female student who suffered severe injuries after
being abducted from her dorm building by a drunken fraternity brother).
81. See Bickel & Lake, supra note 71, at 281.
82. 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 909 (1980).
83. See Bradshaw,612 F.2d. at 137.
84. See id.
85. See Bickel & Lake, supra note 71, at 272-74, 287-88.
86. See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138-39.
87. See id. at 143.
88. It is worth remembering that Dean Wormer's strict tactics backfired in Animal
House. In the end, alcohol-suffused sociopaths, masquerading as ex-fraternity brothers,
brought down the town in a Valhallan triumph of chaos over order. See ANIMAL HOUSE
(Universal Pictures 1978).
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drinking by underage college students, in itself, creates the special relationship on which to predicate liability and, furthermore,
that the college has both the opportunity and the means of exercising control over beer drinking by students at an off campus
gathering. These contentions miss the mark, however, because
they blur the distinction between establishing the existence of a
duty and proving the breach thereof. Bradshaw does not argue
that beer drinking is generally regarded as a harm-producing act,
for it cannot be seriously controverted that a goodly number of
citizens indulge in this activity. Our national public policy, insofar as it is reflected by industry standards or by government
regulation of certain types of radio-television advertising, permits advertising of beer at all times of the day and night even
though Congress has banned advertisement of cigarettes and the
broadcasting industry has agreed to ban the advertisement of liquor. What we know as men and women we must not forget as
judges, and this panel of judges is able to bear witness to the fact
that beer drinking by college students is a common experience.
That this is true is not to suggest that reality always comports
with state law and college rules. It does not. But the Pennsylvania law that prohibits sales to, and purchases by, persons under
twenty-one years of age, is certainly not a universal practice in
other countries, nor even the general rule in North America.
Moreover in New Jersey, the bordering state from which the majority of Delaware Valley College students come, ... the legal
drinking age is eighteen. Under these circumstances, we think it
would be placing an impossible burden on the college to impose
a duty in this case.

... Therefore, we conclude that Bradshaw failed to establish a
prima facie case against the college that it should be charged
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with a duty of custodial care as a matter of law ....

89

In a facially inconsistent line of post-in loco parentis cases, courts
also held that colleges owed duties to protect students on campus from
off-campus intruders.90 How can one distinguish, in principle, between a
woman abducted from a dorm room by a drunk fraternity brother 9' and a
woman abducted by a non-student assailant? 92 Most courts in the immediate post-in loco parentis period never attempted to reconcile this paradox. Like children injured by an attractive nuisance, students asked for
protection from the consequences of their own bad behavior. Unlike the
typical attractive nuisance plaintiffs, however, college students were
much older and had won their rights to self-determination. 93 Further, the
courts' initial perception was that college drinking was uncontrollable
reasonable efforts could not prevent alcoholand unavoidable and, thus,
94
related student injuries.
While post-in loco parentis no-duty case law focused primarily on
male misconduct, young women historically have been the injured persons. For example, in Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan University, it was a
young female who was abducted from her dorm room, 95 and in Beach v.
University of Utah, it was a young woman who drank and fell into a canyon. 96 When women voluntarily join the beer-and-party college culture,
courts show little sympathy for them, especially when their injuries occur

89. Bradshaw,612 F.2d at 142-43 (footnotes omitted).
90. See, e.g., Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Mass. 1983)
(holding that the college had a duty to protect a student who was raped by an outside
assailant); see also Bickel & Lake, supra note 71, at 281-83.
91. See Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E. 552, 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
92. See Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 333.
93. Hence, in Bradshaw, the court placed heavy emphasis on the successful attempts of students to gain a greater range of personal rights and freedoms. See Bradshaw,
612 F.2d at 138-40.
94. See id. at 142.
95. SeeRabel, 514N.E.2dat554.
96. See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413,415 (Utah 1986).
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off campus. 97 Considering the period in which post-in loco parentis noduty cases arose-the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s-women may have won
a certain type of equality in the courts: when a young woman today engages in underage drinking, the courts treat her like a misbehaving young
though fraternities are traditionally more dangerman. This is true even
98
ous than sororities.
Many of the female cases, however, involve women who were
blameless or marginally blameworthy, or whose mistakes did not justify
their own injuries. Thus, no one seriously contends that after a few

drinks, the complainant in Tan/a H. v. The Regents of the University of
California99 deserved to be, or even assumed the risk of being, gang
raped. 0 0 Explaining those cases requires other theories. Some of the
cases could be explained on the basis of the debatable perception that no

reasonable efforts could prevent certain injuries. For example, attempting
to fence in a large national lake to protect very young children is unrea-

sonably burdensome, if not impossible, as many courts seem to believe."" Similarly, preventing all random acts of alcohol violence, or following a young college woman around to protect her from date rape, or
other sexual assault, is equally unreasonable. On the other hand, these
cases may reflect a "fellow-student rule" (like the old fellow-servant

97. See Tanja H. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (first-year female student raped after alcohol was served at a party); Baldwin v.
Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (young female student severely injured in
auto collision occurring in auto race after an off-campus drinking escapade); see also
Crow v. California, 271 Cal. Rptr. 349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (young woman was beaten
by football player whose attacks may have been precipitated by the fact that alcohol was
served in a dorm party).
98. See Diedtra Henderson, Sororitiesand FraternitiesWant a Hand in Solutions:
Actions of Few Mar Image of All, They Asser SEATrLE TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1992, at A7;
John Hill, Abolish Frats, Sororities, Rhode Island Report Say; DENvER ROCKY
MoUNTAIN NEwS, Apr. 17, 1994, at 41A.

99. 278 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
100. See id. at 919 (at no point did the university or the judiciary argue that complainant assumed the risk of being raped by attending a party where alcohol was served).
101. See, e.g., Kravetz v. Perini & Sons, 252 F.2d 905, 909 (3d Cir. 1958); Powell
v. Ligon, 5 A.2d 373, 376 (Pa. 1939).
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rule10 2) or other general assumption-of-risk-type rules analogous to the
old workplace rules.
So far we have seen the in loco parentis and immediate post-in loco
parentis legal culture, but the story does not end there. In recent times (as
with the miscreant male situations), courts have backed off from the noduty approach. A recent series of college law cases challenges the noduty results of the preceding era. 10 3 Thus, in many ways college law
mimics the developments of the law of affirmative duty in other areas.
The power of the bad-boy/no-duty paradigms was so strong as to exert a
discernable influence over the development of American law, even into
the 1970s and 1980s. No-duty approaches to university law, however, are
in retreat as courts recognize that there are realms of "control" which are
less drastic than custody. 1°4
IV.

MEN BEHAVING BADLY

When grown men act foolishly, childishly, drunkenly, or unlawfully, 10 5 and then ask to be assisted from peril, courts often have been
unsympathetic. Some of the most frequently cited and referenced noduty-to-rescue cases are of this type. As with other problem-male categohave recently softened their no-duty stances against
ries, however, courts
06
this type of men.
102. See infranote 175 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 782-83 (Kan. 1993)
(university liable for placing dangerous student in dorm); Furek v. University of Del., 594
A.2d 506, 509 (Del. 1991) (university liable for injuries arising out of drunken fraternity
activity). An extended discussion of the case law and recent shifts is beyond the scope of
this article. For more information on this subject, see Bickel & Lake, supra note 71.
104. See, e.g., Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d
1311, 1324 (Ohio 1997) (holding that "the psychotherapist-outpatient relationship embodies sufficient elements of control to warrant a corresponding duty to control").
105. The men behaving badly cases feature behavior that is not merely negligent
but silly, useless, or pugnacious.
106. Again, there were some notable exceptions. Griswold v. Boston & Maine R.R.
is one of the very few historical cases in which a woman (not at work) was the party
seeking an affirmative duty. See Griswold v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67 N.E. 354, 355

NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43

The Restatement (Second) of Torts cites two well-known cases in
07
and Yania v.
support of section 314's no-duty rule-Osterlindv. Hill1
0
8
Bigan. Both cases have been discredited or superceded in their rationales and reasoning, 0 9 but they are classic instances of men who behave
badly and seek-but do not receive-rescue or other protection.
In Osterlind,two men rented a canoe on the Fourth of July. 10 The
men had been drinking before they rented the canoe.' Shortly after the
men were in the canoe, it overturned and one man drowned.' 2 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that there was no duty to "refrain
from renting [the men] a canoe," nor was there a duty to respond to their

cries for help. 113 The court found that the men were not "helpless,"14 given

that the men held on for a long time before one of them drowned.
The court's emphasis on the decedent's lack of helplessness is odd.
On the one hand, it seems ridiculous that a truly "helpless" person could
(Mass. 1903). In that case, a 19-year-old "girl" trespassed in a rail yard trying to take a
shortcut home. See id. She was struck by a train and needed assistance. See id. In a very
brief opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that there would be
no liability for the injuries she sustained. See id. at 356. On the one hand the court
seemed to emphasize that there was no breach of duty in hitting the plaintiff or in failing
to extricate her more quickly. See id. at 355. The court suggested that the train personnel
acted reasonably once she was hit, or, at the very least, merely exercised less than their
best judgment as to what to do. See id. Yet, on the other hand, the court asserted that no
duty was owed to her or anyone like her once she was struck. See id. The court seemed
satisfied that there had been no negligence and stated: "[W]e have no doubt that such
[reasonable] assistance [to an injured trespasser] has always been rendered." Id. at 356.
Griswold has been questioned and effectively overruled in Massachusetts case law. See
Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d. 467,475-76 (Mass. 1974).
107. 160N.E.301 (Mass. 1928).
108. 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).
109. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue,
supra note 1, at 320-23, 326-29.
110. See Osterlind,160N.E. at302.
111. See id. It is worth noting that canoes do not usually tip over on lakes on calm
days unless someone is not using due care.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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operate a canoe. On the other hand, the focus on helplessness comes
from out of nowhere and seems almost inapposite. It is not the general
rule that one can do anything, even unreasonable things, to non-helpless
people. 115 The focus on helplessness is curious until one considers the
courts' state of mind during the period. At that time, the distinction between pro-active prevention and re-active rescue was not as well formed
as it is today.1 16 Furthermore, landowner/property law paradigms were
very strong." 7 In that context, courts conceptualized the cases in a manner that today's courts would call duty-to-rescue cases. When boys trespassed, their principal method of relief, if any, was the attractive nuisance doctrine with its emphasis on whether someone was in a position
to appreciate the dangers posed-thus a kind of helplessness.
Perhaps more importantly, the Osterlind-era courts crafted a partial
exception to the no-duty-to-protect, men-behaving-badly rules-the doctrine of last clear chance-which played a role similar to the attractive
nuisance doctrine for misbehaving children." 8 Under the traditional approach to contributory negligence, any fault on the part of the plaintiff
was a complete bar to recovery. 1 9 That same doctrine could be applied,
however, to negate a person's responsibility to protect one who had been
rendered helpless by his or her own misconduct. Thus, courts crafted a

115. Today, for example, a canoe operator must use care towards its business invitees. See Thomas R. Trenker, Annotation, Liability of Owner or Operator of Boat Liveryfor Injury to Person,94 A.L.R.3d 876, 881 (1996). Certainly letting a canoe to a helpless person would be per se unreasonable; however, that does not mean that a duty is
owed only to the "helpless."
116. As I have argued previously, we also put a misfeasance/nonfeasance gloss on
cases like Osterlind,when in fact that case, and others, do not truly rely on that type of
distinction. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue,
supra note 1, at 319-29.
117. See Robert L. Rabin, The HistoricalDevelopment of the Fault Principle:A
Reinterpretation,15 GA. L. REv. 925, 947-49 (1981).
118. The doctrine of last clear chance is said to have originated from an English
case in the mid-1800s. See Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 588-89 (1842). As it has
evolved into modem form, the doctrine of last clear chance can be seen in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) oFToRTs §§ 479-80.
119. See, e.g., Butterfieldv. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 926-27 (1809).
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safety valve exception in the last clear chance doctrine so as to require a
person to use reasonable care towards helpless 20 individuals. 12' Al-

though Osterlinddoes not refer directly to the last clear chance doctrine,
the court's focus on "helplessness" follows the principles of this doctrine. Presumably, the two men who had been drinking in Osterlind contributed to their own canoe-related injuries or at least those injuries that

reek of alcohol-related lack of judgment and motor skills control. Thus,
without the doctrine of last clear chance, the men would have had no recovery. They would have had to claim that they were "helpless" individuals;
,, 122court in Osterlind, however, found that the men were not
,,helpless.the

120. See DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
AND SOcIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 265-67 (2d ed. 1993). Faulty individuals were
usually barred from recovery. See id.
121. The last clear chance doctrine was used to negate a defense, not create a duty.
Thus, last clear chance doctrine did not itself create "affirmative" duties. However, the
doctrine functioned much like a "rescue" rule in that it often required reasonable efforts
to protect helpless persons from further harm. Additionally, at the time "classic" noaffirmative-duty-to-aid cases were forming, courts were not as focused on negative and
affirmative duty and misfeasance/nonfeasance questions as commentators are today. See
Lake, supra note 1, at 311-29.
122. It is tempting to make an out-of-context bright line distinction for Osterlind
Thus, one might distinguish between the letting of the canoe (misfeasance type claim)
and the failure to rescue (nonfeasance type claim), and attribute the last clear chance like
logic to the former but not the latter. This is particularly tempting given that Osterlind
seems to focus its "helplessness" reasoning to the time of the letting of the canoe and not
to the twenty-ninth pre-death minute in the lake when the men were truly helpless (although the case does not disclose how the other man survived). However, given the typical ambiguities in the uses of the term duty in that period, see Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, supra note 1, Osterlindmay have understood that "no duty" is owed to a nonhelpless faulty party-which is tantamount to saying
that there is no liability. Therefore, once it was established that there was "no duty" to
refrain from letting the canoe, Osterlind could quickly dismiss the failure to respond to
cries for assistance as "immaterial." See Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (Mass.
1928). "No legal right of the intestate was infringed." Id. The immediate citation to Griswold v. Boston & Maine R.R. for this proposition is instrumental. See id. Griswoldhad
earlier held that merely taking actions, not themselves actionably negligent, does not
create liability for failure to act more quickly or more effectively. See Griswold v. Boston
& Maine K.R., 67 N.E. 354, 356 (Mass. 1903). Arguably, Osterlindmight have focused
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Today, Osterlind is not good law if it is interpreted as a no-duty
case. 23 A canoe or kayak rental entity owes a duty of care to its business
invitees.124 The existence of this duty does not mean that the rental entity
is automatically liable or that it must insure the safety of the customers. It
merely means that a duty exists. 25 Negligently entrusting a canoe or failhelp, howing to seek or provide assistance for a patron known to need
26
ever, would likely raise aprimafaciecase of responsibility.
The 1959 Yania case is a more recent illustration27 of the no-duty
rule--even if the decision borrows from a different era.1
In Yania, a rational adult male jumped into a strip mining cut filled
with water and drowned. 28 Ostensibly, he jumped because his companion taunted him into doing so.' 29 His companion, who owned the land in

on the helplessness of the men in the water and imposed a "duty." However, this would
not work for two reasons. First, last clear chance doctrine was not used to create duties to
bad men: courts did not ask individuals to step out of their way to help misbehaving individuals using last clear chance doctrine. Second, and critically, there is a point at which
almost every "inattentive" person becomes helpless. Thus, a person listening to a walkman while walking on a railroad track is merely inattentive and would have been barred
from recovery. But there is a point at which a person who was inattentive is now functionally helpless; this line-drawing is as much a function of judgment as policy. Fundamentally, the pre-comparative fault courts were unwilling to extend liability to nonnegligent parties for the benefit of men behaving badly. Functionally, the doctrine of last
clear chance operated to split the liability issue. Some bad men recovered, but only if a
party behaved negligently towards that person; no bad man recovered against a nonnegligent person.
123. In Massachusetts, Osterlindhas been overruled by Pridgenv. Boston Housing Authority, 308 N.E.2d 467, 475-76 (Mass. 1974), which questioned and criticized
both Osterlindand Griswold.
124. See Trenker, supra note 115, at 881.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. As I have argued earlier, Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959), is particularly a throwback in that it is ambiguous, in modem terms, as to the basis of its decision.
See Lake, Recognizing the Importance ofRemoteness to the Duty to Rescue, supra note 1,
at 326-29.
128. See Yania, 155 A.2d at 344-45, 349.
129. See id. at 349.
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which the cut existed, allegedly offered no warning and made no effort to
rescue the man. 130 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court treated the drowned
man as a business invitee, but determined that the danger was obvious
and thus required no warning.' 3 1 Additionally, there was no legal obligation to rescue the drowning man because he had made a deliberate decision to jump and the landowner was not "legally responsible, in 1whole
or
32
in part, for placing [the drowning man] in.the perilous position."
Although many courts would follow Yania on its no-obligation-towarn conclusion,133 a no-duty-to-rescue result134 is not one that modem
courts would not typically follow. 35 Even the Restatement (Second) of
Torts recognizes that a business invitee, like the jumping decedent in
Yania, is entitled to some level of care. 136 In today's comparative fault
world, a case like Yania137is more likely to raise questions of contributory
fault and assumed risk.
Yania and Osterlind are not the only cases where men behaving
130. Seeid.at344.
131. See id. at 346; Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty
to Rescue, supra note 1. That rationale is consistent with what modem courts might say.
See, e.g., Herr v. Booten, 580 A.2d 1115, 1119-21 (Pa. 1990).
132. Yania, 155 A.2d at 346.
133. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
134. The specific rationale of Yania is difficult to pin down. Yania is consistent
with no duty, no breach, no causation, and affirmative-defense based no-liability results.
See Lake, Recognizing the Importance ofRemoteness to the Duty to Rescue, supranote 1,
at 326-28. Assuming that Yania is a no-duty case (in the modem sense of the first element of a prima facie case of negligence), its determination is inconsistent with ones
modem courts would reach. At least one recent Pennsylvania court decision has implicitly recognized this problem and effectively recast Yania in terms of assumption of risk,
rather than in terms of duty. See Herr,580 A.2d. at 1121.
135. See RIESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 314A (1965) (business invitee
stands in special relationship to customer/invitee and has affirmative duty to aid).
136. See id. It is curious that the Restatement (Second) of Torts cites Yania in support of section 314's general no-duty-to-aid provision but states a rule in section 314A
that contradicts the result in Yania.
137. In many instances, comparative fault rules and joint and several liability
modifications would combine to create little or no liability. See Lake, Recognizing the
Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, supranote 1, at 360-61 & n.351.
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badly fared poorly. One very common factual scenario involved the duty
to assist an injured trespasser. The classic cases were about men who
trespassed onto railroads and were injured by the trains as well as their
own furtive activities.
In several decisions in the mid-to-late 1800s and early 1900s, courts
showed little sympathy to trespassers who were injured by trains and
thereafter claimed a negligent lack of assistance. 138 These cases are interesting because they occurred during a period when the notion that causing a direct and forcible injury created aprimafaciecause of action was
fresh in lawyers' memories.1 39 The courts in these early cases deliberately insulated railroads from liability to misbehaving males, and often
went out of their way to marshal some of the strongest "no-duty-to-help140
anybody" language of any of the miscreant male cases of that era.
During that period, however, some courts became squeamish and
disagreed with the no-duty approach. 141 Those cases have been superceded by another line of authority; today courts recognize that if a train
hits a trespasser, train personnel must render assistance even if the train
was operated with due care. 142
138. See, e.g., Griswold v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67 N.E. 354 (Mass. 1903);
Kendall v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 76 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1903); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903).
139. The traditional writ of trespass was a vehicle for establishing such liability.
See Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng.Rep. 284 (1616); Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (1 Cush.)
292 (1850). Brown is often credited with igniting the "fault" revolution in America,
where liability on writ of trespass was altered from a focus on how the injury occurred to
the state of mind of the accused actor.
140. Cappieris classic: "With the humane side of the question courts are not concemed." Cappier,72 P. at 282. Cappieralso went on to ratify highly positivist sentiments
about the separation of law and morals, including the notion that there is no legal duty to
save a drowning child, even at zero risk to the rescuer. See id. at 283.
141. See Slater v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 209 F. 480 (M.D. Tenn. 1911); Dyche v.
Vicksburg, 30 So. 711 (Miss. 1901).
142. See, e.g., South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D.
1980); Maldonado v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 629 P.2d 1001 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981);
see also RBSTATEiMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 322 (1965) (stating a defendant's duty to
aid when harm is caused, even innocently, by an instrumentality under the defendant's
control).
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Yet, today, many courts continue to hesitate in recognizing duties to
assist when men behave badly. When this occurs, courts quite often
bootstrap historical case law. A few cases involving men drinking and
Reynolds v. Nichols,144 and Moore v.
fighting-Vermont v. Joyce,1 43
46
4
Willis' a_-ilustrate this point.
Vermont v. Joyce1 47 has been cited to support the proposition that
there is no general duty to aid. 148 Apart from Joyce being an extremely
odd "rescue" case, Joyce also rests on questionable authority. Joyce, in
fact, was not a tort case but rather involved a criminal prosecution of a
father who severely beat his son.149 The father raised as his principal defense to the criminal charge that he was too drunk to form the required
intent.' 5 The father raised a novel argument in the trial court. He argued
that if he "had actually been trying to seriously injure his son, any reasonable person would have done something to stop him."'' In short,
Joyce presented an odd duty-to-rescue case because it raised the question
of whether a criminal defendant could avoid criminal prosecution because others failed to intervene.
The trial court, however, instructed the jury that there was no duty to
not excuse
attempt to stop a fight and that others' failure to intervene did
53
the crime. 152 An appeal to the trial court's decision ensued.
The Vermont Supreme Court considered the effect of Vermont's

143. 433 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1981).
144. 556 P.2d 102 (Or. 1976).
145. 767 P.2d 62 (Or. 1988).
146. The term 'fight' itself is pregnant with an image of competition. Actually, the
cases usually involve someone taking or giving a senseless beating.
147. 433 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1981).
148. "As a general rule, there is no duty under the common law to aid a person
who is in danger." Id.at 272.
149.

See id.

150.
151.
152.
153.

See id.Needless to say, the attempted defense did not succeed. See id. at 273.
Id.
See id. at 272-73.
See id. at 273.
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duty to rescue statute, 54 concluding that the statute did not create a duty
to intervene in a fight because of the peril to an intervenor. 55 There was,
thus, no duty to intervene for the benefit of the son or the father. 156 Joyce
to aid an imperiled
also concluded that there was no common law duty
58
person, 157 citing, inter alia,Reynolds v. Nichols.
Joyce is a poor decision, however, because none of the authority
cited by Joyce supports the proposition asserted. 159 The case featured a

154. See id. Vermont's Duty to Aid the Endangered Act provided:
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or
peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to
others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that
assistance or care is being provided by others.
12 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1998).
155. See Joyce, 433 A.2d at 273.

156. See id. The court also concluded that the bad dad's real argument wasirrespective of duty-that a reasonable person would have intervened. See id. As such,
the alleged error could not have misled the jury. See id.
157.

See id.

158. 556 P.2d 102 (Or. 1976).
159. As discussed earlier, Yania is difficult to pin down and is distinctly premodem as a no-duty case. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the
Duty to Rescue, supra note 1, at 326-29. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965)

states a rule that is narrower than the proposition for which Joyce cites it. Section 314
provides "that the mere fact that an actor realizes or should realize that he must act for the
aid or protection of another, alone, is insufficient to impose a duty." Id. (emphasis
added); see also Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff,58 ALB. L. REv. 97, 126 (1994). Section 314 is a general rule, but it does not state that there is generally no duty to warn. See
id. In fact, the Restatement does not state whether there is or is not such a general rule.
See id. at 126-27. Thus, Joyce's reliance on section 314 for the broader proposition overreaches the source and is inaccurate. Joyce's reliance on Reynolds is misplaced as well, as
I discuss later, see infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text. My criticism of Joyce on
this point should not be misunderstood. First, I believe that the court reached the correct
result. Second, the decision on the common law point is dictum. See Joyce, 433 A.2d at
273. Third, an idiotic and intuitively implausible argument such as the bad dad's argument does not deserve, and might not receive, strict analytical precision. Ultimately, my

NEW YORKLA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43

weak argument by a man behaving badly-who ironically sought the
protection of a duty-to-rescue rule-and a court that applied a common
law no-duty rule where it160could easily and more accurately have disposed
of the common law rule.
Reynolds v. Nichols,161 cited in Joyce, is another misbehaving man
case involving drinking and fighting that has been both bootstrapped and
overstated. In Reynolds, a guest at a party got drunk and assaulted and
stabbed another person. 162 The host was sued on several negligence theories, including failure to control, and warn about, the bad guest. 163 The
court in Reynolds held that there was no liability for a social host to a
third party in such a situation because there was no "reason to know that

focus on Joyce isthat this case should not be used to support broad propositions regarding tort duty.
160. The court in Joyce could easily have ruled that even if there is a duty there
was no breach of that duty as a matter of law. It would be patently unreasonable to ask a
bystander to rush into a serious brawl involving a drunken man. Any reasonable person
would assume that there would soon be two victims. The Joyce court could have used the
statute as a per se shield here as well; why would the court interpret the common law
more broadly than the statute itself? Alternatively, the Joyce court could have simply
ruled that there is no duty to intervene in a fight to protect a drunken man from criminal
prosecution. In effect, the bad dad asked the court to adopt a rule protecting him from his
own misconduct. The court correctly decided not to do so.
161. 556 P.2d 102 (Or. 1976).
162. See id. at 103.
163. See id. at 103-04. Itisworth noting that Reynolds isnot an affirmative duty
case because the central arguments were that the "host" took unreasonable actions, created an unreasonable risk, and then failed to fix it. See id. The case is not like cases where
a stranger happens to see someone in need. As such, it should not be cited for the proposition that there is no common law duty to aid. The only language in Reynolds that would
seem to support such a rule is when the court cited to Cramerv. Mengerhausen,550 P.2d
740, 743 (Or. 1976), to the effect that there is no duty to aid one in peril in the absence of
a special relationship. See Reynolds, 556 P.2d. at 104. However, the issue in Reynolds
was not whether a special relationship existed to control the conduct of another but
whether or not the host could reasonably foresee danger in giving alcohol to this guest.
See id. Perhaps misfeasance should be a kind of special relationship, as alluded to in Alexanderv. Harnick,237 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977), but courts do not typically say
this, and that is not the approach taken in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 31421 (1965).
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the combination of liquor and [the attacker's] violent propensities would
prompt him to assault plaintiff ....164
Although the Reynolds court held that there was no basis to impose a
"duty," 165 the case must be placed in proper perspective. First, given the
court's repeated emphasis on the failure of the plaintiff to state a "cause
of action" on the pleadings, 166 it would be fair to interpret Reynolds to
mean that a duty may exist to not serve liquor to one with known dangerous propensities. There could be no breach of, or predicate for, such a
duty in Reynolds, however, since there were no facts suggesting that the
host knew of the danger. The term "duty" is often used by courts in an
ambiguous way, sometimes conflating "duty" in its strict sense as the
first element of aprimafaciecase of negligence with predicate facts that
establish such a duty and breach thereof. 167 For instance, one could say
that one has failed to allege facts which impose a duty in a situation
where no reasonable juror could determine that a duty was breached.
Certainly, it would be appropriate for a court to rule as a matter of law
that no cause of action is stated in such a situation.
Second, Reynolds has been interpreted narrowly in its own jurisdiction. In Moore v. Willis, 168 another case involving a violent encounter
with drinking men and guns, 169 the Supreme Court of Oregon revisited
the issue of the necessity of pleading foreseeability to establish a cause of
action. 170 Moore revisited Reynolds and interpreted it as a decision that
rested on fact bases:

164.

Reynolds, 556 P.2d. at 104. In declining to impose social host liability, the

Reynolds court followed the majority rule. Further, whereas a landowner may be liable

for inviting or having a dangerous person on her premises, Reynolds would certainly be
ahead of the field to the extent that the danger arose simply out of serving alcohol to a
social guest on the premises. Thus, Reynolds is a bad boy case with a twist in that it subtly suggests expanded social host liability.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Lake, Duty in Negligence Law, supra note 5.

168. 767 P.2d 62 (Or. 1988).
169. See id. at 62-63.
170. See id. at 62-65.
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Reynolds v. Nichols... illustrates inadequateallegationsoffacts
from which afacy/nder could conclude that the defendant should
have known of a danger. A social guest of the defendants in that
case stabbed the plaintiff, who was visiting the defendants' next
door neighbor. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants served
alcohol to their guest, who became intoxicated and assaulted the
plaintiff. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants should
have known of their guest's violent propensities and his intent to
do violence. Despite those allegations, the court found that the
complaint did not state a claim. The court upheld a judgment on
the pleadings for the defendants.
Part of the rationale for the Reynolds decision was that the complaint did not allege that the defendants had reason to know that
serving alcohol to the guest would trigger violence. Reynolds offers the following dicta:
If the complaint had alleged that defendants served intoxicating
liquors to Simmons [the defendant's guest] with reason to know
that the combination of liquor and Simmon's violent propensities
would prompt him to assault plaintiff, it is arguable that a cause
of action might have been stated.
In other words, the complaint did not state a claim for relief because it did not allege facts that would allow a determination that
the defendants should have known that serving alcohol to their
guest created a risk of violent behavior .... [T]he complaint in
Reynolds did not allege facts that would support a determination
that the defendants had reason to know that violence could re17
suit. 1
Joyce and Reynolds illustrate the ways in which historical aversions
to men behaving badly and recovering in tort on failure-to-rescue theories have translated into recent case law. The historical cases have been

171. Id. at 65 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted); see also Buehler
v. State, 853 P.2d 798, 805 (Or. 1993).

1999]

BAD BOYS, BAD MEN,AND BAD CASE LAW

superseded (e.g., Yania with a duty to rescue an invitee), overruled (e.g.,
Osterlind,Buch), or rationalized into modem categories of tort analysis
(e.g., Yania into assumption of risk analysis). Yet, somehow a rule without solid foundations has been perpetuated here and there in statements
setting forth rules in cases like Joyce and Reynolds, which themselves do
not establish adequate foundations for no-duty-to-rescue rules. 172 Neither
Joyce nor Reynolds provides support for a decision to deny efforts to rescue a helpless young girl who merely needs someone to summon assistance. As is evident in Reynolds, however, the temptation to cite a case
like Joyce for a broad no-duty-to-rescue rule can bring a no-duty-torescue myth into reality. In modem terms, Joyce and Reynolds show the
may have to deny affirmative
powerful but weakening pull that courts
1 73
duties with respect to misbehaving boys.
V. WORKPLACE IMMUNITIES

It is a fascinating and typically overlooked fact that much of our historical no-duty-to-rescue mythology can be traced directly to nineteenth
and early twentieth century workplace immunity rules. 174 When men and
women went to work, they typically assumed the risks of the job-

172. There is a growing body of case law that rejects the traditional approach. See
Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988); Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff supra
note 159, at 138-51.
173. Joyce and Reynolds are narrow and readily distinguishable cases (and Reynolds suffers from inbreeding by citing Joyce). Modem courts are breaking away from
no-duty rules even in bad boy and bad man cases. See, e.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 240
N.W.2d 217, 219 (Mich. 1976) (older boy who had been drinking and accosting young
women entitled to rescue). The trend is particularly noticeable when bad men put others
at risk. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (landmark decision permits action against psychotherapists who do not take reasonable precautions for
the benefit of those endangered by maniacal patients-often men who attack women or
children).
174. The RESTATmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) refers to sixteen specific
cases in support of that section in the reporter's notes. Four of those cases are workplace
cases. See id.
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including risks associated with fellow servants. 175 The workplace no
duty/no recovery notion was so broad that an injured worker needing
76
assistance was considered to be entitled to nothing from an employer.1
Except for some of the rhetoric in the no-duty-to-aid employees cases
being exceptionally cold-blooded and pseudo-positivistic, the cases kept
with a general employer immunity milieu. 77 The courts of that era seem
175. See, e.g., Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 26 S.C.L. (I McMul.) 385 (1841);
Farwell v. Boston and Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 49 (1842). Today, fellowservant rules have typically been superceded by workers' compensation schemes, but
there are some survivors. See, e.g., Pomer v. Schoolman, 875 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1989).
176. See Allen v. Hixson, 31 S.E. 810, 810 (Ga. 1900) (employee trapped in machine not entitled to reasonable efforts to get released from machine); Stager v. Troy
Laundry Co., 63 P. 645 (Or. 1901) (no duty to have someone available to extricate an
employee from a machine); King v. Interstate Consol. Ry., 51 A. 301 (R.I. 1902) (employer not responsible to provide food, shelter, or transportation to an employee even if in
great danger); Matthews v. Carolina & N.W. Ry., 94 S.E. 714 (N.C. 1917) (no duty to
rescue an employee's chattels from destructive force not caused by employer).
177. In Allen, 31 S.E. at 810, a young woman brought her supervisor to view a
machine that was not functioning. She put her hand into the machine to demonstrate the
problem to the supervisor and her hand got caught and crushed on the machine. See id.
She writhed in agony for approximately a half-hour before help was summoned. See id.
The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that her act was in the nature of a volunteer and outside the scope of employment: no duty was owed even to use reasonable efforts to extricate her. See id. Allen features some classic positivistic rhetoric:
As to so much of the petition as claims damages because the "defendant negligently allowed petitioner's hand and wrist to remain between said roller and bar," or because of the defendant's "negligently
failing ... to effect her release," we do not think a good cause of action is set forth. When an employe[e], without fault on the master's
part, becomes placed in a dangerous or painful situation, the master is
under no positive legal duty of exercising all reasonable care and
diligence to effect such employe[e]'s speedy release. Being in no way
responsible for the unfortunate occurrence, the master cannot be said
to be guilty of a tort if he does not promptly take active steps in coming to the rescue. The only duty arising under such circumstances is
one of humanity, and for a breach thereof the law does not, so far as
we are informed, impose any liability.
Id. Such decisions are so shocking that only by suggesting that law and morals are separate can they be "justified."
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to have been caught in a kind of Draconian contract-based logic. Because

malfeasance by an employer was not actionable in the workplace, absent
some agreement to the contrary, courts rarely recognized an affirmative
duty to rescue and thus rejected employer responsibility to provide assistance to injured employees.1 78 As if to underscore that these decisions

178. American courts may have been influenced by English courts of the period,
which likewise felt that there was no duty to assist an injured employee. See C.T.
Drechsler, Annotation, Master's Duty to Carefor or to FurnishMedical Aid to Servant
Stricken by Illness or Injury, 64 A.L.R.2d. 1108 (1959):

(1) The question whether a master is under a duty to care for or to
furnish medical aid to a servant who is stricken by illness or injury in
the course of his employment arose first in a number of early English
cases. In some of these cases, decided in the 18th century, a strong
tendency was apparent on the part of the courts to recognize the existence of such a duty in the case of menial or house servants. There is
even language seemingly recognizing the existence of such a duty in
the case of servants generally, but it is doubtful whether these statements are more than inaccurate expressions of the rule limiting the
duty to house servants. But be that as it may, early in the 19th century
the English courts expressly rejected any previous notions to the contrary, and definitely established as a rule applicable to servants of all
descriptions that there is no duty resting on the master to provide
medical attendance or medicine for a servant who is injured or becomes ill while in his employ. Apparently this change in attitude was
due primarily to the rise in social and economic status of servants as a
class and to the replacement of the existing paternalistic attitude of
the master toward his servants by the more or less impersonal relationship between master and servant characteristic of modem industrial society. Reflecting the economic and philosophical theories of
early capitalism, the law of the early 19th century recognized the servant as an individual equal to his master not only in a political but
also an economic sense, who does not need the protection of the law
in his contractual dealings with others. It was for later generations
and for another country to see the socially undesirable implications of
these theories in their application to the question under annotation.
Thus, there are several English cases decided in the first half of the
19th century which strictly and broadly deny any obligation on the
part of the master toward his servants as to providing medical aid in
case of sudden illness or injury, regardless of circumstances. No case
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were not part of the law of affirmative duty and not motivated by judicial
aversion to the modem right to be rescued, some courts determined that
no duty to aid was owed even when an employer negligently caused the
worker's injury. 179 The workplace no-duty cases were sui generis and did

of more recent origin has been found which indicates, and there is
therefore no legal basis for assuming, that the rule as expressed in the
early cases referred to above has been changed and does not represent
the law in England today.
(2) Turning now to this country, it does not come as a surprise that
the English doctrine denying any duty on the part of the master was
adopted originally without any qualifications by all the American
courts in regard to all servants who received compensation from the
master for their services. It was held that a master is under no legal
obligation to care for or to furnish medical aid to a servant who is injured or becomes ill while serving the master for compensation. This
rule was expressed in a variety of ways and was applied in the case of
individual employers as well as corporate employers, and with particular frequency in the case of railroads.
Id. at 1114 (footnotes omitted); see also Newman v. Redstone, 237 N.E.2d 666, 668
(Mass. 1968).
179. Drechsler writes:
The rule that the master was under no obligation whatsoever to
provide medical aid for his sick or injured servant was so thoroughly
embedded in the legal doctrines of the time that even the fact that the
servant's injury or illness was caused by, or resultedfrom, the onployer's negligence, was considered immaterial so far as the appcability of the rule was concerned. Only in the case of a servant giving his services without compensation was an exception made, if the
existence of such an exception may be assumed from the few dicta
referring thereto. The exception, if it was a valid exception at all, was
obviously based on the fact that an implied promise on the part of the
master to provide medical aid to the servant may be more feasibly
read into the contract of hiring in a case in which the employee receives no compensation and has, therefore, presumptively little or no
financial ability to provide medical aid for himself, than in a case in
which the employee is the recipient of wages.
Drechsler, supra note 178, at 1114 (footnotes omitted); see also Davis v. Forbes, 51 N.E.
20, 20 (Mass. 1898) ("defendant was under no legal obligation to furnish the plaintiff
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not focus heavily on specific concerns about men and boys behaving
badly. The cases did not always feature foolish employees. 180 The cases
also did not present overwhelming numbers of male employees as they
often featured women workers. 81 Thus, these cases had a separate lineage from other no-duty cases.
Today, the no-duty-to-assist/protect-an-injured-employee rule has
been overwhelmingly eradicated.' As courts (and legislatures through
[servant] with medical attendance, even if he had been liable for the injury . . ."), superceded by Newman v. Redstone, 237 N.E. 2d 666, 668 (Mass. 1968) (following modem
rule favoring a duty to rescue an employee).
180. Even though the woman in Allen was considered to be outside the scope of
employment, she was trying to finther a master's purpose. SeeAllen, 31 S.E. at 810.
181. In a number of cases cited by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in support of
section 314 (1965), the employees did not act but were instead injured by their employers. Furthermore, half the cases involved women. See id.
182. See Drecshler, supra note 178, at 1114.
While ...the American courts originally adopted unquestioningly the general rule as developed in England to the effect that the
master is under no duty to care for or to furnish medical aid to his
sick or injured employee, later developments of the law in this country brought a limitation of, or exception to, the unqualified application of the rule. During the second half of the 19th century courts in
various jurisdictions, particularly in the Middle West, were shocked
by the results of the rule in more extreme circumstances, and they
pointed out that in emergency situations the master has a moral duty
to look after his servant where action is demanded to save the servant's life or to prevent further serious bodily injury to him. It was
only one step from recognizing the moral obligation to the creation of
an analogous legal duty. Under the increasing pressure of what may
be called the "modem social conscience," these courts created an exception to the general rule, which was at first strictly limited to employees of railroad companies and which imposed upon such companies the legal duty to provide in an emergency situation medical aid
to a servant stricken in the course of his work and rendered helpless
to care for himself. While originally strictly limited to railroad companies, which, since they required many of their employees to be absent from their home localities and families, were considered more
responsible for creating emergency situations than employers with
stationary places of work, in later years this exception was extended
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workers' compensation statutes) in the mid-twentieth century rejected the
nineteenth century approach to employees, they often recognized the

non-positivistic influence of morality on law. As the New
Jersey
183
Supreme Court stated in Szabo v. PennsylvaniaRailroadCo:

In our judgment there is a sound and wise exception to this
rule, founded upon humane instincts.
That exception is, that where one, engaged in the work of his

master receives injuries, whether or not due to the negligence of
the master, rendering him helpless to provide for his own care,

dictates of humanity, duty and fair dealing, require that the masto cover all types of employers in cases where medical assistance was
imperatively demanded to preserve life or to prevent further serious
harm. Even though this so-called emergency doctrine was expressed
by the courts in a variety of ways, it seems that these various statements were intended to cover more or less identical situations. And
since the doctrine was supposed to take care of situations of extreme
human need, the fact that the master was completely free of guilt, as
far as the creation of the emergency situation was concerned, was
considered immaterial and his obligation was established regardless
of fault.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(b) (1965) (acknowledging special relationships between employer and employee sufficient to impose
duty to aid); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 512 (1997):
(1) If a servant, while acting within the scope of his employment,
comes into a position of imminent danger of serious harm and this is
known to the master or to a person who has duties of management,
the master is subject to liability for a failure by himself or by such
person to exercise reasonable care to avert the threatened harm. (2) If
a servant is hurt and thereby becomes helpless when acting within the
scope of employment and this is known to the master or to a person
having duties of management, the master is subject to liability for his
negligent failure or that of such person to give first aid to the servant
and to care for him until he can be cared for by others.
(footnotes omitted).
183. 40 A.2d 562 (N.J. 1945).
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ter put in the reach of such stricken employee such medical care
and other assistance as the emergency, thus created, may in reason require, so that the stricken employee may have his life
saved or may avoid further bodily harm. This duty arises out of
strict necessity and urgent exigency. It arises with the emergency
and expires with it.
This precept probably had its inception in the code of moral
conduct, but, like many others, such as furnishing the employee
with a safe place in which to work, and proper tools with which
to labor, has become a legal duty incorporated in every contract
a lack of specific
of hiring, by legal inference, notwithstanding
18 4
provision or statutory requirement.
Thus, a major area of no-duty to assist case law has been largely
eradicated. Ironically, and inappropriately, the workplace cases formed
what is now a crumbling foundation for modem analysis of no-duty-torescue rules.
VI. BAD CASES-THE LACK OF FOUNDATION FOR
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 314

Modem courts often look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for
guidance regarding the duty to rescue. 85 They rely heavily on section
314,186 which purports to state the general no-duty rule. 187 The Reporter's
Notes cite sixteen cases in support of section 314-over half of which

184. Id. (citations omitted); see also Hunicke v. Meramee Quarry Co., 172 S.W.
43, 54-55 (Mo. 1914) (discussing basis of duty rule in basic humanity).
185. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue,
supra note 1, at 329 n.100; John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonablenessof Strangers: Some ObservationsAbout the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to
Aid or ProtectOthers, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 867, 877 n.41.

186. See Adler, supra note 185, at 877 n.41.
187. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 314 reporter's notes (1965).
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were decided prior to the end of World War J.188 These sixteen cases are
no longer good law, however; they have been overruled, discredited, superceded, over-generalized, or misinterpreted. Thus, the foundations of

section 314 stand in ruin. The assumption that there was some magic historical consensus on a no-duty-to-rescue rule is misguided, and the case
law that allegedly justifies such a belief is no longer accepted.
Four cases cited in the Reporter's Notes support the proposition that
an employer owes no duty to assist an imperiled employee. 89 Although
these cases have not been explicitly overruled, they have been superceded by the majority rule that employers have a duty to assist injured
employees in an emergency situation.190 These four cases also suffer

from over-generalization and misconstruction. They were decided in accordance with the strong no-duty-in-the-workplace immunity concepts
crafted in the nineteenth century, 91 and should not be applied to strang188. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 reporter's notes (1965). The sixteen cases cited are: Gautretv. Egerton, L.R. 2 C.P. 371 (1867); Toadvine v. Cincinnati,
N.O. & T.P. Ry., 20 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Ky. 1937); Gilbert v. Gwin-McCollum Funeral
Home, Inc., 106 So.2d 646 (Ala. 1958); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Scruggs & Echols, 49 So.
399 (Ala. 1909); Allen v. Hxson, 36 S.E. 810 (Ga. 1900); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E.
1058 (Ind. 1901); Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928); O'Keefe v. W.J. Barry
Co., 42 N.E.2d 267 (Mass. 1942); Matthews v. Carolina & N.W. Ry., 94 S.E. 714 (N.C.
1917); Schichowski v. Hoffman, 185 N.E. 676 (N.Y. 1933); Stager v. Troy Laundry Co.,
63 P. 645 (Or. 1901); Prospertv. Rhode Island Suburban Ry., 67 A. 522 (R.I. 1907);
King v. Interstate ConsolidatedRy., 51 A. 301 (R.I. 1902); Riley v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R.R.,
160 S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955); and
Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).
189. The cases are Allen v. Hixon, 36 S.E. 810 (Ga. 1900); Stager v. Troy Laundry
Co., 63 P. 645 (Or. 1901); King v. InterstateConsolidatedRy., 51 A. 301 (R.I. 1902); and
Matthews v. Carolina & N. W. Ry., 94 S.E. 714 (1917). Matthews stands for the notion
that an employer does not have to protect an employee's chattels from destruction and is
thus readily distinguishable from duty-to-rescue cases that involve risk to human life. See
Matthews, 94 S.E. at 714-15.
190. See, e.g., Conveyors' Corp. of Am. v. Industrial Comm'n, 228 N.W. 118, 120
(1929) ("It is the duty of an employer to rescue his employee from a position of imminent
danger in an emergency."); State v. Hunter, 911 P.2d 1121, 1124 (1996) ("Special types
of relationships ... have been found to create a duty to render aid, such as ... employer/employee .... ).
191. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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ers in need of rescue.'
Two of the remaining cases cited in support of section 314 involve
misbehaving boys.1 93 Today, a duty of care could attach in a number of
ways in a factual scenario similar to the one presented in Riley v. Gulf, C.
& S.F. Railway Co. In Riley, the defendant's instrumentality caused the
harm, the defendant's employees took charge of the victim, and the defendant's employees interfered with a rescue. 194 Riley is better described
as a no-breach-of-duty case. There is language in Riley to support such a
reading, given that95 the defendant's failure to provide treatment may have
been reasonable.1
Sidwell v. McVay, which is one of only three post-World War II decisions cited by the Reporter, was decided before Rowland v. Christian,196 a case that directly or indirectly influenced a number of jurisdictions to change entrant status classifications, particularly with respect to
social guests. 197 Today, most people live in jurisdictions where an invited
social guest is owed a duty of reasonable care, including a duty to assist
if reasonably necessary. 198 This is not the case today in Oklahoma, however, where Sidwell was decided. 199 Even so, Sidwell clearly was owed
some duty, though not the protective, proactive duty asserted by the in-

192. Indeed, some cases from this period dealing with injury outside the workplace take a pro-duty stance. See, e.g., Depue v. Flateau, 111 N.W. 1, 3 (Minn. 1907)
(duty to assist dinner guest stricken with illness); see also Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, supranote 1, at 334-39. Humanitarian cases

like Depue were ignored by the Restatement in favor of sixteen weak no-duty cases.
193. The cases are Riley v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 160 S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913), and Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955). These cases have already been
discussed supranotes 14-42 and accompanying text.
194.
195.

See Riley, 160 S.W. at 595-96.
See id. at 597.

196. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
197. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 57, at 147-49.
198. See id. While not quite a majority rule, in terms of the states' population, the
social guest rule is a majority rule. See Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law,
supra note 5, at 11.

199. See King v. Lunsford, 852 P.2d 821, 822 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
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20 0

jured boy.
Sidwell can be better categorized as a no-breach-of-duty case, or as a
pre-comparative fault assumption-of-risk/contributory negligence case.
The plaintiff was an older child who knew what he was doing, knew the
risks involved, and had brought the danger onto the property.20 ' Obviously, even bad homeowners owe little responsibility to protect a social
202
we
guest against open and obvious dangers, particularly when the danger
20 3
is brought onto the premises by the guest. Neither of these cases supports a general no-duty-to-rescue rule in the sense that some courts may

use it.
Two cases cited by the Reporter's Notes in support of section 314
deal with men behaving badly 20 Osterlindv. Hill, the famous drowningmen-n-a-canoe case, is no longer good law as a no-duty case in Massa205
chusetts. In Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, a case involving a
trespassing older boy who was caught in an elevator, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court rejected older no-duty cases, including Osterlind,
by recognizing a duty to aid the trapped boy. 06 Moreover, business customers like the men in Osterlindare owed a duty of reasonable care aris-

200. When the Sidwell court stated that "[i]n the case before us there is a complete
absence of proof of any duty to plaintiff owed by any of the defendants," the court was
simply rejecting the particular duty asserted by the plaintiff (basically an attractivenuisance duty) on the grounds that the plaintiff was a social guest. Sidwell v. McVay, 282
P.2d 756, 757 (Okla. 1955).
201. See id.at758.
202. See, e.g., Zuther v. Schild, 581 P.2d 385, 387 (Kan. 1978) (holding that no
duty was owed to a woman who slipped on ice while leaving the defendant's home after a
girl scout meeting, as the icy conditions were obvious to the plaintiff).
203. See Sidwell, 282 P.2d at 758-59.
204. The cases are Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928), and Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).
205. 308 N.E.2d 467 (Mass. 1974).
206. See id. at 475-76; cf Rhodes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E. 2d 1260,
1272 (111. 1996) (rejecting Pridgen and stating that no legal duty should be imposed on
landowners to take affirmative action to rescue injured trespassers, as infra note 236).
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ing from the business/customer special relationship. 2 7 This duty might

not extend, however, to providing a fool-proof rescue plan or to having
all possible means to effect a rescue on hand.20 8 In addition, Osterlindis
arguably not even a nonfeasance/affirmative duty case in that it raises
questions regarding negligent entrustment of the canoe. 209 Osterlind,like
many cases of its era, can be better understood as a no-breach-ofduty/affirmative defense case. 1 0
Yania v. Bigan also presents interpretation problems, and has been

interpreted narrowly even in its own jurisdiction.21' Yania does not
212

reflect modem duty-to-rescue rules with respect to business entities,
and should also be considered a pre-comparative fault case. 13 Yania has
become powerful because of its214 ambiguity; it is far too easy to
characterize or caricature the case.
Cases like Yania may take on mythic proportions through overgeneralization. For example, in Jackson v. City of Joliet,215 Judge Posner
207. See, e.g., Urban v. Wait's Supermarket, Inc., 294 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (S.D.
1980) (holding that the supermarket owed a duty to a woman who tripped over a watermelon in defendant's store).
208. See Moore v. City of Ardmore, 106 P.2d 515, 516 (Okla. 1940). The plaintiff
brought suit on behalf of a decedent who drowned in a city lake. See id. Plaintiff sued the
City of Ardmore for renting the decedent a boat that was not equipped with air flotation
chambers or life preservers. See id. The court found that the city owed the decedent no
duty to equip the boat with these safety devices. See id. at 516.
209. See Osterlind, 160 N.E. at 302 ("The defendant's employees placed a helpless man, a man impotent to protect himself, in a dangerous position.").
210. See Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue,
supra note 1, at 320-21.
211. See Herrv. Booten, 580 A.2d 1115, 1121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
212. See, e.g., O'Shea v. K. Mart Corp., 701 A.2d 475, 476 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997).
213. At the time of Yania, a person who assumed a risk was not entitled to recover.
214. In discussing the enduring significance of many of Judge Cardozo's opinions
like Palsgrafv. Long IslandRailroadCompany, Judge Posner has pointed out that such
cases became powerful because they have "omni significance"--a little something for
everyone. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY INREPUTATION (1990). Yania,
although not written by Judge Cardozo, is just such a case.
215. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983).
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considered a section 1983 claim involving a flaming car crash and police
and fire personnel who allegedly did not do enough to extricate individuals from the flaming wreck. 16
The court rejected the section 1983 claim, but suggested the possibility that the case may have presented a viable state tort claim for failure to
rescue.2 1 7 Much of what Posner had to say about state common law duty
was dictum and occurred in a context where dictum suggested a common
law duty to rescue existed:
Now there is of course no general common law duty to rescue a stranger in distress even if the rescue can be accomplished
at no costs to rescuer. And although circumstances can create
such a duty, ... a mere failure to rescue is not tortious just because the defendant is a public officer whose official duties include aiding people in distress. But if you do begin to rescue
someone you must complete the rescue in a non-negligent fashion even though you had no duty of rescue in the first place. The
rationale is that other potential rescuers (if any) will be less
likely to assist if they see that someone is already at the scene
giving aid. This rationale is strained in some cases, ... but not
here: with a policeman and firemen at the scene of the accident,
no motorist was likely to assist the occupants of Ross's burning
car--especially when the police officer was directing them away
from the scene.21 8
Judge Posner cited Yania for the "general common law" rule, even
though Yania was not a case involving strangers and is readily distinguishable2 1 9
216. See id. at 1201-02.
217. See id. at 1203 ("But even if the complaints state good claims under general
tort principles, it does not follow that they state good claims under section 1983 just because the defendants are public officers.") (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 1202-03 (citations omitted).
219. In Jackson, a young couple, including a pregnant mother, were trapped in a
flaming wreck (the cause of the crash unknown). See Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1201. In
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The Illinois Supreme Court applied "the general common law rule"
in Rhodes v. Illinois CentralGulf Railroad,220 a classic modem day misbehaving male decision that states the following proposition: "Our common law generally imposes no duty to rescue an injured stranger upon
one who did not cause the injury in the first instance."2 21 The only nonIllinois state case cited to support the no-duty proposition is Jackson v.
City of Joliet,222 which relies upon Yania as its principal source for its
similar proposition. Rhodes does not advert to Posner's use of Depue v.
2 22 and Hutchinson v. Dickie,2 4 but to the idea, also stated by
Flateau
Posner, that a rescue must be reasonably completed once it has begun.225
Jackson and Rhodes teach important lessons about Yania and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 314. First, once a male-behavingbadly case finds its way into the law it can become insidiously embedded
in opinions stating propositions, which, when further decontextualized,
are used to create grand, general statements that lack a firm foundation.
Second, bootstrapping also helps to make bad case law and to create
myths about the values inherent in our legal system.
In addition to the eight cases discussed above, the Reporter's Notes
to section 314 cite to eight additional cases. 226 Each one of these cases

Yania, a man in full capacity deliberately jumped in a body of water and drowned. See
Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. 1959). By overgeneralizing Yania and other bad
male cases, one can reach results that are patently unjust and inappropriate. We should
not forfeit our basic right to humanitarian treatment just because some individuals choose
to do so.
220. 665 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. 1996).
221. Id. at 1270.
222. See Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1202. A see also cite to section 314 shows the ways
in which a court may turn to a section of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965)

uncritically and risk further bootstrapping.
223. 111 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907).
224. 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947).
225. See Rhodes, 665 N.E.2d at 1269.
226. The eight cases are: Warshauer v. Lloyd Sabaudo, 71 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 610 (1934); Frank v. United States, 250 F.2d 178 (3d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 962 (1958); Bartlett v. State, 301 P.2d 985 (Cal. App.
1956); Furst v. Carrico,175 A.2d 442 (Md. 1954); Long v. Patterson, 22 So.2d 490
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provides little or no support for the section 314 rule today.

A. Gautretv. Egerton
In Gautret v. Egerton,2 7 an English decision, one judge stated: "[N]o
action will lie against a spiteful man who, seeing another running into a
position of danger, merely omits to warn him., 228 This proposition, stated
without supporting authority, presumably led the Reporter to section 314.
Not only is Gauret a foreign case decided well after the adoption of the
United States Constitution, it cites no relevant pre-Constitution authority
and establishes little more than typical entrant-status-classification/dutyowed propositions.
In Gautret, the victim-who would have been at best a licensee under today's law-fell into a cutting on defendants' land and died as a
result. 229 The plaintiff's allegations of wrongdoing were essentially that
the defendants had on their land a dangerous (but obvious) condition and
someone was injured by it.230 Whereas a typical licensor owes no duty to
make premises safe, as an invitor would, the plaintiff tried to argue that
such a duty was owed to the decedent and others. 231 In short, apart from
some flourishing dictum, Gautret stands for the absence of a duty owed
by a landowner to licensees (or trespassers); it is neither a rescue case
nor a novel232landowner case. It should not be broadly interpreted by way
of dictum.

(Miss. 1945); Miller v. Muscarelle, 170 A.2d 437 (N.J. 1961); Weinfeld v. Kaplan, 26
N.E.2d 287 (N.Y. 1960); and Galicich v. Oregon Short Line R.IR, 87 P.2d 27 (Wyo.

1959).
227. 2 L.R.-C.P. 370 (1867).
228. Id. at 375.
229. See id. at 372.
230. See id. at 374.
231. See id. Moreover, there was no indication in the allegations as to specifically
what was to be done. See id.
232. For what it is worth, there is solid American authority for the notion that a licensee (for example, a social guest) is due reasonable care if in peril and the landowner
knows of the peril. See, e.g., Depue v. Flateau, 111 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907); see also Hut-
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B. Hurley v. Eddingfield
In Hurley v. Eddingfield,233 the complaint alleged that a physician
caused the death of his patient by refusing to render aid after the patient
had summoned him for assistance.234 The court determined that in the
absence of a contractual arrangement, the doctor was not required to render assistance, even if the refusal to do so was arbitrary.235
Although some people rush to generalize Hurley, it is a case susceptible to a narrow as well as a broad reading. The defendant did not contest "that, before the enactment of the law regulating the practice of
medicine, physicians were bound to render professional service to everyone who applied. ' ' 2 36 Technically, the defendant argued that a general
physician licensing statute does not itself create a duty to aid "on other

chinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947). There is also authority for the notion that
a trespasser whose imminent peril is known is due reasonable assistance, whether or not
caused by any activity or condition on land. See Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 308
N.E.2d 467, 470 (Mass. 1974) (due care owed to trespassing 11-year-old); cf. Rhodes v.
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1270-71 (Ill. 1996) (no duty to rescue trespassing drunken college-aged males when cause of injury not due to any activity or condition on landowner's property and when the injury and evidence of peril are not obvious
to the landowner).
233. 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901).
234. See id. at 1058.
235. See id.

236. Id. The Hurley court noted that the plaintiff draws "analogies... from the obligations to the public on the part of innkeepers, common carriers and the like," but rejected them as " beside the mark." Id. Given that the court did not hear counsel to be
arguing a background common law right to treatment, the plaintiff must have been seen
as making statutory arguments. It is tempting to read too much into why the plaintiff did
not make the common law argument. One might assume that it was thought to be a weak
argument. Notwithstanding the special relationship between the doctor and patient (the
patient was not a stranger), this argument assumes too much. It may well have been the
case that the doctor had many good reasons to refuse treatment, even if he did not offer
them to the patient. Hurley emphasized the alleged wrongful act was the doctor's refusal
to contract to treat, not the unreasonablerefusal to treat. See id. (emphasis added). The

plaintiff may have lacked the evidence of breach of duty apart from some hoped for negligenceper se argument.
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terms than [the doctor] may choose to accept. '237 In essence, Hurley held
that it is not negligence per se for a doctor to refuse to aid someone, even
a previous patient, under a general licensing statute. This narrow reading
of Hurley is consistent with the similar longstanding notion that the failure to comply with general medical licensing statutes does not raise an
implication
of negligence per se, even in a doctor's active treatment of a
238
patient.
In keeping with the pattern of zealous over-generalization of these
historical cases, Hurley has been read broadly. Thus, as one typical
commentator in the 1950s wrote: "[Hurley] held that a physician was not
under a duty to administer to his patient. The physician gave no reason
for refusing to respond to a call, there were no other doctors available
and the patient died, but no liability attached to the doctor., 239 The Restatement (Second) of Torts used the broader reading to support section
314 and thus advanced an over-generalized Hurley and no-duty-to-rescue
rule.
The inherent weakness of the broad no-duty rule in the medical pracfice context is reflected by the complexity of modern rules requiring physicians and hospitals to treat emergency patients and the concomitant
qualified immunities that follow. 24 ° Today, a doctor or hospital may have
a duty to treat a patient in an emergency situation.241 A broad, unqualified Hurley rule of no physician duty is no longer the rule in the United
States, although a physician continues to enjoy some protection from

237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197, 198-99 (N.Y. 1926) (holding that
the absence of a license to practice medicine alone does not necessarily prove negligence
in treatment).
239. Gerald L. Gordon, Moral Challenge to the Legal Doctrine of Rescue, 14
CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 334, 335 (1965); see also Brodersen v. Sioux Valley Mem'l
Hosp., 902 F. Supp. 931, 940 n.10. (N.D. Iowa 1995).
240. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the rejection of a broad Hurley
rule in modem times. For an extensive treatment of this and related issues, see Brodersen,
902 F. Supp. at 940-56. (discussing the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act).
241. See, e.g., Brodersen, 902 F. Supp at 940-41.
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242

Hurley, in fact, has been overstated and superceded. The effect of
section 314 bootstrapping historical cases into broad proportions and
then using that bootstrapping to support section 314-which, in turn,
validates the bootstrapped interpretation of such cases-is particularly
evident in Hurley and its progeny.
C. Prospertv. Rhode Island SuburbanRailway Co.

The fact that Prospertv. Rhode Island Suburban Railway Co. 243 has
no subsequent history signals its unusual nature. In Prospert,a woman
and child were traveling on an electric car when the car was stalled by
heavy snow.244 Despite efforts to move the car, the woman and child
spent nearly twelve hours trapped inside it.245 The woman was so angry
that no effort had been made to remove her and her child from the car
and to move them to a warm place that she sued on negligence
grounds.246 The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant carrier,
and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. 247
Not noted for luminous opinions in that era, that Rhode Island court
determined that no "duty" (meaning no negligence) was owed and employed positivistic rhetoric, which gained this case a place in history, in
support of section 314:
The defendant could not be held to be guilty of negligence in
failing to further operate its car after it had been stopped by the
snow, having exhausted all its power in the effort to move the

242. See, e.g., Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977) (citingHurley for
the proposition that a doctor does not have to accept everyone as a patient in the absence
of statutory authority to the contrary).
243. 67 A. 522 (R-1. 1907).
244. See id. at 522.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
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car from time to time against the accumulation of the snow. It
was not, then, guilty of negligence in not carrying the plaintiff to
her destination; and, having carried her as far as it could by the
exercise of its power with the appliances at its disposal, it had
done all that could be required to carry out its legal duty in her
behalf. It would, indeed, have been an act of humanity and kindness on the part of the conductor, as of any other person seeing
the plaintiff helpless and exposed to injury from cold and snow,
to have helped her to a place of safety, if possible; and the duty
of so doing, resting in moral rather than in legal obligation,
would have been a personal one, resting upon the conductor or
the motorman as an individual, and not as an agent or servant of
the defendant corporation, in the same way and to the same extent that it would have rested upon any individual, had the plaintiff seen fit to leave the car and endeavor to struggle through the
snow to a place of safety. The duty of assistance or rescue in distress in such case rests, not in contract, or in legal obligation, but
in moral obligation growing out of human relations,
and there248
fore is not a proper ground of action for damages.
The court reached the correct result in the case, but it did so for the
wrong reasons. The duty of a common carrier to aid a passenger in distress is-and was-so well established that no court could seriously follow Prospert on its no-duty rationale. 249 Prospert makes more sense,
however, as a no-breach-of-duty case. As the court repeatedly emphasized, there was no evidence that a safe haven actually existed prior to
the time when the removal was completed.2 50 That fact alone could justify a directed verdict given that it is a plaintiff's burden to show a breach
of duty owed. The plaintiffs entire theory of the case was that it was
negligent to not have removed the plaintiff and her daughter sooneralthough the plaintiff offered no evidence that reasonable alternatives
248. Id. at 523.
249. See, e.g., O'Shea v. K. Mart Corp., 701 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997).
250. SeeProspert,67 A. at 523.
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existed.251 Moreover, the defendant eventually removed the plaintiff and
infant to safety, 252 and it is possible
that any attempt to move them earlier
2 53
dangerous.
more
been
have
would
Prospertused the term "duty" in the sense of standard of care. Later,
when other courts rushed to find no-duty rules, they overlooked the fact
that the Restatement (Second) of Torts de-emphasized the term "duty"-unlike modem courts-in favor of just such a mixed message.
D. Louisville & Nashville RailroadCo. v. Scruggs & Echols
254
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Scruggs & Echois is another no-negligence case blown out of proportion by section 314 because
of some unfortunately overbroad language. In Louisville (a bench trial) a
railroad was accused of negligently moving its railroad cars to a place
where they interfered with firefighting efforts. 5 The defendant had
placed a fairly lengthy train between a fire hydrant and the burning property of the plaintiff.2 56 The railroad did not cause the fire and had no
knowledge or reason to know of it until after the train was moved. 57
There was no proof that the train was deliberately or negligently placed
to block the path of the firefighting equipment. 58
After the train had been innocently moved into this intersecting position, plaintiff requested that the defendant move the twenty-five-car
train.25 9 The train remained in the problematical position for a very short
time-between five and twenty minutes-before it was cleared to move

251. See id
252. See id. at 522.
253. See id. at 523.

254. 49 So. 399 (Ala. 1909).
255. See id. at 400.

256.
257.
258.
259.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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by the dispatcher. 60 On clearance, the defendant immediately moved the
train. 61 The trial judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Supreme

Court of Alabama reversed. 262 The majority opinion-somewhat typi-

cally for the period-used the terms "duty" and "negligence" interchangeably.2 63 The court framed the question presented as one of duty
and violation of duty simultaneously. 264 It is not surprising that a court
considering these facts might find in favor of the defendant, given that
there was no negligence in positioning the train or in the response time.
Undoubtedly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts focused on language that "there is ... a distinction to be drawn between an active and a
passive use, in the enjoyment of one's property rights. 265 The court

stated: "The law imposes no duty on one man to aid another in the preservation of the latter's property, but only the duty not to injure another's
property in the use of his own.' 266 As a matter of duty, this proposition
was debatable at that time and has been superceded today.267
There was substantial authority at common law that a landowner

260. See id. The dissent pointed out that "[a]ccording to the testimony for the
plaintiffs, the employe[e]s in the physical control of this train evinced, after full notice,
an indifference to the situation and emergency that was little short of shocking." Id. at
402. Of course that was the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses and moving a large train
in no more than twenty minutes at the request of an outsider is still pretty quick, particularly considering that the plaintiff was not seeking assistance from personal injury but
frompropertydamage.
261. Seeid.at400.
262. See id. at 400.
263. See id. at 400.
264. See id. "But one question is argued for our consideration, and that is whether
there was a duty owing from the defendant to the plaintiffs, under the facts, for a violation which the plaintiffs have a cause of action." Id. The court considered, as a singular
issue, the questions of duty and breach, clearly putting the issue in factual terms. Later,
the court stated that the defendant was guilty of no negligence and in a subsequent paragraph equated "legal responsibility" with "duty." Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Again, the court used the term "duty" and the phrase "legal responsibility" interchangeably. See id.
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owed no off-premises duty to others for natural conditions causing injury
or damage. 268 Yet, it was and continues to be well-recognized today that
active operations or artificial conditions on land would give rise to an
off-premises duty of reasonable care. 269 A case like Louisville, which
attempted to craft an active/passive distinction in place of a natural/artificial distinction, was not the norm at the time. Moreover, Louisville is an artificial conditions case and would today be a "duty-owed"
case.270 Courts today are moving towards an abolition of artificial/natural
distinctions in favor of a simpler reasonable-care-owed-off-premises
rule.2 7'
Thus, Louisville should not be interpreted in an overbroad way for
several reasons. First, it is tempting, but unfair, to read Louisville strictly
as a "duty" case, given the posture of the case and the ambiguous way in
which the court used the term "duty" to include "breach of duty." Second, it is a case involving property damage, not human life. Third, to the
extent that the case is a duty case, it was not solid law in its day, and very
clearly has been superceded today. Louisville is overbroad as a no-dutyto-rescue case and represents a rule that is no longer good law.
E. Schichowski v. Hoffman
Schichowski v. Hoffman272 is an unusual case involving corporate
discovery and contempt proceedings. In Schichowski, a corporate secretary failed to appear for a scheduled deposition and was held in contempt.27 3 As a condition of purging himself of contempt, the secretary
had to appear for the deposition with certain corporate books.27 4 He did
268. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 57, § 9.04, at 149; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 363(1) (1965); Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
269. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 57, § 9.04 at 149.
270. Thus, it is not necessarily a duty-breached case.
271. See DIAMOND FF AL., supra note 57, § 9.04, at 149-50; Taylor v. Olsen, 578
P.2d 779 (Or. 1978); Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1981).
272. 185 N.E. 676 (N.Y. 1933).
273. See id. at 677.
274. See id.
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not have the books, however, as he had given them to the corporate
did not turn the
president at an earlier time.275 Because the president••276
The secretary
books over to the secretary, the secretary went to jail.
then sued the president for the imprisonment and won at the trial level.277
In reversing, the New York State Court of Appeals noted that the
case was "novel" and cast the president, who refused to "rescue" the secretary from imprisonment, as a "stranger" to the proceedings. 278 To the
extent that the secretary could not produce the books through reasonable
efforts, the court criticized the order of contempt imprisoning the secretary.279 The secretary, however, was hardly a model citizen in complying
with court orders and process, as he failed to show up for his own contempt hearing.280 Nonetheless, the court recognized that the secretary
sought to make a collateral attack on the order of the court by bringing a
private tort claim against the president of the corporation.2 8'
In disavowing a right to such a collateral attack, the court made
broad statements about a "duty":
Our concepts of legal duties are not static in a changing
world. They grow and change as new conditions arise; as life becomes more complex in its social relations; as the social conscience of the community imposes upon its members new
obligations or frees them from old obligations. The field in
which a man may with impunity cause damage to another for his
own selfish ends has been restricted by statute and, at times,
even by judicial decision. The field in which a man may be held
liableforfailure to take affirmative action to avertfrom another
damage which may arisefrom causes which he has not created

275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 676-77.
278. See id.at 677.
279. See id. at 678.
280. See id.
281. See id.
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has not been greatly enlarged.The plaintiff here was threatened
with the consequence of acts which the court had adjudicated
constituted a willful disobedience of its mandate. The court
could relieve the plaintiff from these consequences if convinced
that the plaintiff was using his utmost endeavors to comply with
that mandate. The defendant, not having caused the court to act
or refrain from acting, was not under a legal duty to come to the
plaintiffs aid. If the plaintiff did in fact willfully disobey the
mandate of the court, he cannot shift the penalty to the defendant. A sense of loyalty to an associate or employee who was
threatened with imprisonment because he had served the defendant too faithfully might well have impelled the defendant to
plaintiff's assistance. The law imposed no such duty
come to the
282
him.
upon
This language, which must have caught the eye of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts reporter, framed the case in terms of affirmative duty.
Notably, although the language of Schichowski suggests further expansion of affirmative duty liability, 283 the court did not expand such duty in
that case.
Schichowski is readily distinguishable from the typical duty-torescue case. In Schichowski, an emergency was created by an arguably
erroneous judicial decision. The person in need of rescue (a kind of
corporate misbehaving boy) was not lily-white, and he substantially
contributed to his own state of contempt and imprisonment.
Schichowski stands for the rule that one may not sue a third party in
tort as a collateral attack on discovery/contempt orders. The best way to
attack a contempt order is through the appropriate processes, not through
a tort suit against another party. Schichowski remains one of the oddest
no-duty-to-aid cases and has fallen into desuetude. The question of
whether a party should have a legal duty to intervene in proceedings in
front of a court of competent jurisdiction, for the benefit of another party,

282.
283.

Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
See id.
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is different from the question presented when a person in physical danger
is in an emergency situation.
F. Toadvine v. Cincinnati
Toadvine v. Cincinnati2 4 is a case that is inapposite to the affirmative duty problem; it raises the procedural question of removal jurisdiction and an alleged duty to watch for people to rescue. The case does not
support the rule stated in section 314, or any broader "no-duty-to-rescue"
proposition. Instead, Toadvine appears to have been carelessly placed in
the Reporter's Notes." 5
In Toadvine, a train accident case was removed from a Kentucky
state court to a federal court sitting in diversity. 28 6 The plaintiff moved to
remand the case to state court after joining
a resident defendant in an at27
jurisdiction.
diversity
defeat
to
tempt
The non-resident defendant, an employee of the railroad, operated a
signal tower at the intersection of his employer's and another railroad
company's railroad lines.2 88 The highway crossing where the accident
occurred was "near" an intersection of the two railways, but the nonresident defendant's duties as an employee extended only to regulating
and controlling the safe crossing of trains at that intersection.89 The nonresident defendant was not aware of the peril of the plaintiff, nor was it
his job to monitor the road crossing. 29° The duty of the railroad itself to
maintain a safe crossing was not the question presented; the question
presented was whether an employee in some vague physical proximity to

284. 20 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Ky. 1937).
285. A close reading of the case discloses that the court used the term "duty" in
many ways, including the sense of "duty" as an employee with respect to employment
responsibilities and obligations.
286. See Toadvine, 20 F. Supp. at 227.

287.
288.
289.
290.

See id.
See id. at 228.
See id.
See id.

1999]

BAD BOYS, BAD MEN, AND BAD CASE LA W

a potential accident has an affirmative duty to perform another employee's work duties and use reasonable care to discover the perils of
others.29 '
Toadvine decided that, at least for purposes of defeating removal jurisdiction, no such "duty" existed.292 Had Toadvine held otherwise, each
Santa Claus at Macy's might be charged with the responsibility to discover what perils the other Santa Clauses were creating for children and
customers at other entrances to the store. The matter would be entirely
different if the employee in Toadvine knew of peril to a person. There is
a big difference, however, between a duty to rescue and a duty to find out
who might need to be rescued. In the Toadvine case, for example, placing the burden of the watchman's obligations on the non-resident defendant signal operator would have increased the risk of train collisions as
much as placing the burden of the signal operator's duties on the watchman would have made the crossing less safe. If there was a problem in
the way the employment duties were divided, delegated, and supervised,
it was not due to the negligence of the employees. Perhaps it might have
been reasonable for the company to post a watchman in the signal area
nearby, but the failure to post a watchman could not have been the fault
of the signal operator.
Toadvine is a case about an attempt to defeat removal jurisdiction by
imputing corporate responsibility to an individual employee, and courts
generally will not hold corporate employees personally liable for torts
committed by the corporate entity. Moreover, Toadvine establishes, at
most, that one ordinarily has no affirmative duty to seek out people to aid
or rescue. 293 It is an easy case on that point, given that a reasonable em-

291. See id. at 227.
292. Toadvine used the term "duty" in several senses. In addition to using the term
to describe one's employment responsibilities, see id. at 228, the court used the notions of
duty and breach thereof interchangeably. See id. at 227-28.
293. Courts have been understandably reluctant to require individuals to seek out
those who are in the need of assistance. Even police and fire departments are subject to
public duty immunities, requiring the creation of a special duty to the plaintiff before
responsibilities attach. See, e.g., Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y.
1987). Mandating a society of roving saints would be very unproductive, particularly in
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ployee would, ceterisparibus,stick to his job and avoid doing other employees' jobs, particularly when a lack of such focus would increase the
risk to others in their area or sphere of responsibility.294 Toadvine is not a
case of the absence of affirmative duty. It may not even be an affirmative
duty case-after all, the railroad did have a duty to keep the crossing reasonably safe and to operate its trains reasonably safely. The question was
not whether a responsibility to295protect existed, but whether that employee had such a responsibility.
Q.

O'Keefe v. William J.Barry Co.

O'Keefe v. William J Barry Co.296 is another weak case in support of
section 314. O'Keefe merely establishes some innocuous propositions
about responsibilities with respect to operations that create hazards in
297
abutting areas to a premise.
In O'Keefe, a woman was injured when she stumbled over rocks that
today's society where someone usually knows of or has strong reason to know of another's peril.
294. Recall that in this period, or just prior, such an act would be considered volunteering, and a supervisor could leave a person with his arm caught in a machine. See,
e.g., Allen v. Hixson, 36 S.E. 810 (Ga. 1900).
295. It is not entirely clear what language drew the Reporter's Notes to Toadvine.
At one point the court distinguished legal and moral obligations:
The right of recovery afforded by the law for losses occasioned by
negligence is necessarily limited to those losses which occur in the
breach of a legal duty and not for the failure to observe moral or humane obligations. Such limitation is necessary to restrain the law's
remedies from being pushed to an impracticable extreme. "There
would be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies if the ill effects of the negligence of men may be followed down the chain of results to the final effect."
Toadvine, 20 F. Supp. at 227 (quoting Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 202 (1879)).
However, the court interwove concepts of duty, breach, and even proximate causation.
Toadvine, 20 F. Supp. at 227-28.
296. 42 N.E.2d 267 (Mass. 1942).
297. See id. at 268-69.
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had allegedly fallen from the defendant's trucks carrying onto a highway
leading from the defendant's quarry.2 98 There was quite a bit of traffic on
this driveway, and the stones may have come from any number of locations. 299 Indeed, there was no evidence that the offending stones came
from the quarry's trucks, nor was there any evidence of negligence as to
how the rocks got in the driveway. 300 There was also no evidence that the
defendant had exclusive control of the public roadway.3 °1 The jury found
for the plaintiff, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated
the judgment.30 2 This case merely established that, in these specific circumstances, there was no "rocks ipsa loquitur."30 3
The Massachusetts court pointed out that the defendant quarry did
not control the roadway and was under no duty to remove the stones30if4
they were deposited there "through no negligence of the defendant.
"[U]nless the rock was shown to have been placed upon the driveway by
the negligence of the defendant, as the plaintiff alleged, the fact, if it
were a fact, that the defendant's watchman was supposed to remove the
crushed rock from the driveway was not an admission of negligence of
the defendant.' 30 5 Given that the quarry employed a watchman, "[o]ne of
whose duties was to clear the driveway of stone,, 30 6 it could be tempting
to twist these assertions into a no-affirmative-duty posture. That posture,
298. See id. at 267.
299. See id. at 267-68.
300. See id. at 268.
301. See id.
302. See id. at 267-69.
303. To establish breach of duty in the absence of specific evidence of negligence,
a plaintiff must turn to the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturfor assistance. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965). Typically, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
had exclusive control of the instrumentality of injury at the time of the negligence. See,
e.g., Dermatossian v. New York City Transit Auth., 492 N.E.2d 1200 (N.Y. 1986). Although the Massachusetts Court did not directly refer to res ipsa doctrine, the way the
court emphasized the defendant's lack of exclusive control over the roadway would have
precluded a res ipsa charge to the jury. See O'Keefe, 42 N.E.2d at 268.
304. See O'Keefe, 42 N.E.2d at 268.
305. Id. (emphasis added).
306. Id.
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however, would be highly misleading.
First, the fact that a duty to clean up the driveway may have existed
does not mean that it was breached. An admission of a duty assumed is
not an admission of a breach. Second, the company, by its use of a
watchman, may have assumed a duty of reasonable care to clean up its
own rocks, but does not mean that the quarry assumed a duty to clear up
all hazards, regardless of who created them. There was no suggestion
that the watchman even knew of the presence of the rocks in the road. °7
The plaintiff essentially sought a rule, as in Toadvine,0 8 whereby one
would be duty-bound to watch for persons to assist.
Later Massachusetts case law recognized O'Keefe as support for
these principles. 30 9 Typically, unless one has assumed a duty, or created a
hazard, there is no necessity to patrol abutting property areas for persons
to protect or aid:
It is settled that "an abutter in control and occupation of
premises as between himself and the public must exercise reasonable care to maintain his premises in a ... [reasonably] safe
condition so as not to cause injury to the public traveling on the
way, and if he knows or ought to know that the use which he is
making or permitting to be made of his premises is rendering the
public way dangerous for those passing along the way, he may
be found liable to a pedestrian who thereby sustains an injury .... ,,310 It is equally well settled that "[u]nless the unsafe
condition of the sidewalk resulted from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant, it had no duty-breach of which would
constitute negligence-to keep the sidewalk in a reasonably safe

307. See id.
308. Toadvine v. Cincinatti, 20 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Ky. 1937).
309. See, e.g., Wallace v. Folsom's Market, 177 N.E.2d 778 (Mass. 1961).
310. Id. at 779 (quoting Mays v. Gamarnick, 93 N.E.2d 236, 237 (Mass. 1950)).
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condition for the use of travellers.

311

O'Keefe does not reach or decide the more difficult issue of whether
a watchman must act for the benefit of others if he knows that someone
else's rocks are in the road that he ordinarily patrols. O'Keefe can be interpreted consistently with either a duty posture or a no-duty posture.

H. Gilbert v. Gwin-McCollum FuneralHomes, Inc.
In Gilbert v. Gwin-McCollum Funeral Homes, Inc.,312 the plaintiff
was hurt in a car accident while riding as a passenger in the last car of a
funeral procession.313 The plaintiff alleged that the funeral director was
responsible because, having undertaken to direct and lead the procession,
he negligently failed to provide safe passage to the members of the procession, failed to provide an escort or other protection for the procession,
and failed to warn approaching vehicles of the presence of the funeral
procession.314 While the funeral director assembled the procession and
provided some direction, he did not operate, own, or otherwise control
the vehicles once they left for the cemetery.31 5
The plaintiffs action was dismissed, and the Alabama Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal.3 16 The Alabama Supreme Court held that in
the absence of an express or implied contract, the mere fact that the funeral director led and arranged a funeral procession did not impose a
duty to protect vehicles in the procession from other vehicles on the
highway.3 17 Gilbert stressed the fact that the funeral director lacked control over the vehicle in which the passenger was riding, and distinguished

311. Id. (quoting Farolato v. Springfield Five Cents Say. Bank, 39 N.E.2d 948,
949 (Mass. 1942)).
312. 106 So.2d 646 (Ala. 1958).
313. See id. at 647-49.
314. See id.at 648-49.
315. See id. at 649-50.
316. See id.at 653.
317. See id.
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the situation in Gilbert from a situation in which an "undertaker was under contract to transport the funeral party to the cemetery and back, [and
had] hired the cars from a third party placing them in the procession, and
[had given] them written instructions of operation with regard to
3 19 in ruling
safety. ' 318 Gilbert also gave the case a Palsgraf-like flavor32
0
injury.
of
type
this
for
that no duty was owed to this plaintiff
Gilbert is poorly reasoned. It was not a case where a person fainted
and needed assistance, but received no aid. Rather, Gilbert was a case
where the drivers of the colliding vehicles had duties to protect the plaintiff. The funeral director did not have to protect the plaintiff from the
misdeeds of others, particularly since he had no control over the conduct
of the other drivers. 321 Gilbert is not really an affirmative duty case in a
strict sense. The funeral director took actions-although allegedly not
enough actions-with respect to the procession.32 2 The funeral director
was not some stranger who blithely watched a truck plow into a processional, but was an active participant in the funeral who simply did not
know of the oncoming truck.
VII.

MISBEHAVING MALES AND No-DUTY-To-RESCUE RULES TODAY

Perpetuation of the misbelief that a no-duty-to-rescue rule was once
dominant and remains the general rule today323 is due in part to: 1) courts

318. Id. at 652. Gilbertstated simply that these facts were not the ones at hand.
See id. Apparently, the existence of a contract, funeral parlor hired cars, and written instructions would have made the difference in surviving demurrer. One might quarrel with
the court's somewhat aggressive use of demurrer.
319. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
320. See Gilbert, 106 So.2d at 650, 652.
321. See id. at 648-50.
322. See id. at 652.
323. In Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484, 485 (7th Cir. 1995), for example,
the court had "to grapple with the elusive concept of 'duty' in the law of torts" in the
context of a case raising the standard of care owed by a firefighter fighting a blaze on
private premises. In surveying the law of duty in a non-duty to rescue case, Judge Posner
observed:
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Should a passerby be liable for failing to warn a person of a danger?
The courts thought not, and therefore said there is no tort duty to rescue. Even if the defendant had acted irresponsibly or even maliciously in failing to warn or rescue the passerby-suppose, for example, the defendant had been aware of the danger to the plaintiff and
could have warned hin at negligible cost-the plaintiff could not obtain damages. This limitation on the scope of the duty of care has
stood but others have fallen by the wayside in most or all states, such
as the nonduty of care of a manufacturer to users of his defective
products other than the first purchaser, the nonduty of care of an accountant to persons who rely on his audit report but have no contractual relation with him, and the nonduty of care of railroads in avoiding fire damage to anyone other than the owner of buildings or other
property actually struck by the railroad's sparks, as opposed to owners of property to which the fire that had been started by those sparks
spread.
Id. at 488 (citations omitted).
Judge Posner's opinion echoes a commonly heard theme: that rescue rules remain a
last bastion of no-duty rules. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 185, at 877; see generally Joseph W. Little, Erosion of No-Duty Rules, 20 Hous. L. REv. 959 (1983). Although Edwards is not a duty-to-rescue case, Judge Posner's dictum in a federal diversity case is
fodder for citation. Judge Posner's opinion, and other modem opinions, cite the classic
cases of Osterlindv. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928), and Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343
(Pa. 1959), without giving attention to their current standing. Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151
S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966), is another frequently cited case that does not deserve,
but receives, over-generalization. In Handiboe, a very young child drowned in a
neighbor's pool while a servant was supposedly looking after that child and the homeowner's child. See id. at 907. The poor child drowned in just three feet of water and apparently was unable to get out of the pool because the bottom was covered with slimy,
slippery leaves, trash, and scum. See id. Treating the four-year-old decedent as a mere
licensee, and not subject to an attractive nuisance rule, the court held that no actionable
negligence arose from the failure of the sitter to protect the child. See id. at 906-07. The
complaint also contained an allegation to the effect that "defendant's servant [failed] to
rescue the plaintiff's child from the perilous situation ..... Id. at 907. The court did not
make reference to any other facts alleged, so we do not know whether the court's use of
"rescue"' might have meant only protecting the child from falling in. Nonetheless, the
court stated a broad no-duty-to-rescue rule, which has been cited repeatedly by the Georgia courts, see, e.g., Alexander v. Hamick, 237 S.E.2d 221, 222 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977), as
well as courts in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Edwards, 50 F.3d at 488. Although the noduty-to-rescue position of Handiboereceived little analysis and looks like a throw-away
point in the opinion, courts are eager to seize on it without attention to some fairly obvi-
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and commentators continuing to cite cases without due regard for their
context and (subsequent) history; 324 2) the success of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in basing a rule on sixteen weak cases;3 25 3) the paucity of cases where people act in complete disregard of a fellow human
being's peril; 326 4) concerns about unlimited liability;327 5) practical limitations on a duty-to-rescue rule; 328 and 6) the fact that sentiments against
miscreant males still make subtle waves in the law. 329 The situation is
such a tangled mess that courts today either follow the herd,330 avoid the
question, or in an increasing number of cases, reject the pseudo-historical
approach in favor of a general duty of reasonable care.
Not surprisingly, because miscreant males remain a problem in modem society,331 they account for some prominent no-duty rules (in spite of
ous points. First, Handiboe would not be followed in most states under the attractivp
nuisance doctrine. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text. Second, most Americans live in a jurisdiction where the infant was owed a duty of reasonable care as an invited social guest. See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text. Third, even the
Georgia appellate courts recognize that when someone increases the risk of peril, or assumes responsibility, a duty attaches. See Alexander, 237 S.E.2d at 222.
324. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 12-44 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 105-173 and accompanying text.
327. See supranotes 174-184 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 185-226 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484, 488-90 (7th Cir. 1995)
(expressing, however, hints of criticism).
331. In 1996, highway deaths rose in America (41,907 fatalities in 1996), and it
has been common knowledge that young men and alcohol create inordinate risk. See
Matthew L. Wald, Repeal of U.S. Speed Limit Is Found to Raise Highway Deaths,N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, § 1, at 36. However, a "new" phenomenon has been identified that
is believed to contribute to the increase in highway deaths. Ricardo Martinez,
administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, testified before a
Congressional subcommittee in 1997 to the effect that "road rage" (aggressive driving)
accounts for about one-third of the fatal crashes and two-thirds of the resulting fatalities.
See Road Rage: Causes and Dangers ofAggressive Driving: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 105th
Cong. 25, 26 (1997) (statement of Ricardo Martinez, M.D., administrator, NHTSA).
David K. Willis of AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety reported on a study of over 10,000
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the erosion of no-duty rules generally).332 For example, many of the noduty-to-college-student cases involve miscreant males injuring themselves or others.333 Only recently have courts been willing to consider
claims against psychotherapists for failure to protect against their patients' violent tendencies. 334 Today, most of these duty-to-protect cases
involve criminal males or males that threaten women with violence. Despite a wave of acceptance of the basic duty notion, several courts have
expressed reluctance to protect women categorically from dangerous

male patients.335 Underlying such cases is a sentiment that it is not fair or

appropriate for health care professionals to be responsible for uncontrol-

lable, heinous male behavior. No-duty-to-rescue cases today continue to
take their cues from misbehaving-male scenarios.
Consider the very recent case of Rhodes v. Illinois CentralGulfRailroad,336 which states a narrowly drawn no-duty-to-rescue rule-albeit in
a classic example of going back to an imagined past. This case has it all:
a railroad; a trespassing, drunken person; college freshman tom-foolery;
and hints of a new future.

Early one Saturday morning, the defendant's commuter train person-

accidents occurring in 1990-1997. See id. at 85-86 (statement of David I. Willis, President, AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety). The conclusion: the majority of aggressive
drivers are men aged 18 to 26. See id. at 86 (Willis). Martinez identified them as bad
males: "'double-O drivers,' licensed to kill in some ways, because they have a license
and they have the car and they have this belief of independence and fully in control of the
vehicle." Id. at 73.
332. See, e.g., Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988).
333. See, e.g., Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987).
334. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
(recognizing a psychotherapist's duty to protect a third party from a violent patient's
expressed intentions to kill her).
335. See Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 502 (Va. 1995) (finding no duty to
warn a woman of an abusive male's release from a mental institution); see also Fraser v.
United States, 674 A.2d 811, 812-13 (Conn. 1996) (no duty to control psychiatric outpatient who attacked a third party).
336. 665 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. 1996)
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nel saw a person lying face down in an unmanned train station.33 7 This
person was Carl Rhodes, an eighteen-year-old male in his freshman year
of college. 338 Rhodes had been drinking heavily that evening and, in his
quest for alcohol, had received a serious blow to the head.339 Rhodes
showed some signs of being injured-though not severely-and otherwise appeared to be a homeless person who had spent the night in the
warm train station. 340 Eventually, the train personnel, with the assistance
of law enforcement, brought Rhodes to a hospital.341 By that time, however, it was too late-Rhodes had earlier received a nearly invisible intercranial head wound that had gone beyond the point of repair.342 Rhodes was treated by the train personnel like the numerous homeless people
who populate our rail stations; but if he had received medical treatment a
few hours earlier, he may have survived.343 When the train personnel
found Rhodes, however, there was little evidence to indicate the severity
of his injury.34
Although the evidence did not clearly show there was any breach of
duty, the trial court instructed the jury that a landowner owes a duty to
trespassers who are discovered in a "place of danger." 345 The jury returned a verdict against the railroad, which was upheld by an intermediate appellate court.346 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, and remanded the case to the trial coirt with instructions to determine whether
Rhodes was a patron or a trespasser.34 7 In Illinois, a landowner has no
duty to take affirmative action to aid an injured trespasser. 348 There is a
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See id. at 1263.
See id. at 1263-64.
See id.
See id.
See id.

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

See id. at 1265-66.
See id.
See id. at 1266.
See id. at 1267.
See id.
See id. at 1274.
See id. at 1270.
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limited exception, however, which Rhodes reaffirmed, that a landowner
has "the duty to use ordinary care to avoid injury to a trespasser who has
been discovered in a 'place of danger' on the premises." 349 The court distinguished the situation at hand, however, by pointing out that Rhodes
35 0
had not been injured by either a condition or activity on the premises.
"The place of danger exception does not arise," the court held, "simply
because a trespasser is discovered in an injured state on the landowner's
premises. 35 1
The court was not asked to disregard "the longstanding general rule
that there is no duty to take affirmative action to aid an injured

stranger,, 352 but the court did engage in some extensive and strong no-

duty-to-rescue analysis.353 With this caveat, the court ruled that there was
349. Id. at 1268. Rhodes thus affirms a duty-to-rescue rule for trespassers in some
circumstances. See id.
350. See id. at 1269.
351. Id.

352. Id. at 1271.
353. See id. In strong language, the court stated:
Certainly, the impracticality of imposing a legal duty to rescue between parties who stand in no special relationship to each other
would leave us hesitant to do so. Our law recognizes that, while persons may owe a moral duty to take affirmative action to help a fellow
human being in distress, legal liability for failing to do so should not
be imposed.
As noted by Prosser and Keeton, discussing the continued adherence
of the common law to the general rule:
the difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to
fellow men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible
situations where fifty people might fail to rescue one, has limited any tendency to depart from the rule to cases where some
special relation between the parties has afforded a justification
for the creation of a duty, without any question of setting up a
rule of universal application.
In this same vein, another writer has remarked, "it may be that [a
general rule imposing a duty to rescue] involves a risk of making

NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43

no duty to rescue a trespasser injured by something other than the landowner or his premises.354

It is hard to believe that the Rhodes court would have been so stem if
a pregnant woman had trespassed and needed obvious assistance to deliver a baby, but had received indifference. Rhodes is distinguishable
because of three critical features. First, the trespassing, drunk male was
injured earlier, before entering the railroad's premises. Second, the injuries were not obviously life threatening and the victim looked much like
the people who inhabit the stations of our transportation systems. Courts

do not typically require investigation into the identity of persons in need
of rescue. Third, the case could have been easily disposed of on nobreach-of-duty grounds, as there is little evidence that the train personnel
operated unreasonably. The Rhodes case certainly provided a number of
points which may be distinguishable in future cases. Once again, however, a miscreant-male case creates no-duty law, even if far more narrowly than some of the historical cases did. No doubt, Rhodes will also

good-hearted people liable without fault, as where a timid automobilist is sued for refusing to pick up a 'thummer,' who in fact needs help
or where a swimmer drowns in full view of unobservant, or perhaps,
stupid people."
Likewise, principles of morality may dictate that a landowner take
steps to rescue a trespasser found injured on his premises, but legal
liability should not flow from the failure to do so. We cannot accept
the plaintiff's suggestion that we should be swayed by the fact that
ICG was a business, rather than a private, landowner. The rule here
sought by the plaintiff, imposing a duty on ICG to rescue Carl simply
because he was discovered injured on ICG's property, would apply to
all landowners, including private homeowners, because the only required relationship with the landowner is the trespasser's presence on
the property. We are not persuaded that we should adopt a rule which
could render a homeowner liable to an injured, drunken stranger who
comes to rest on the homeowner's lawn.
Id. (citations omitted). The court did not address the issue of whether a landowner would
owe a duty to one "lawfully" on his or her premises. See id. at 1271-72.
354. See id. at 1272.
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be carelessly followed.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Historical no-duty-to-rescue cases are by no means on firm footing;
however, they have achieved derivative validation through secondary
sources (especially the Restatement (Second) of Torts) and some modem
case law, which systematically overstate the historical rules without critical examination of their context. Some of this overstatement is rooted in
the fact that certain problematical male behavior has driven courts to protect defendants as a matter of law against miscreant males who seek to
impose the consequences of their behavior on others. Alternatively, some
of this overstatement is due to a curious desire to elevate certain cases to
broad generality, while downplaying more humanitarian case law. Also,
some of the overgeneralization arises from the failure to distinguish affirmative duty from meta-affirmative duty: there is a difference between
asking someone to provide aid and asking someone to patrol the world
looking for people to aid. Finally, some of this overstatement is due to
the susceptibility of the common law to find a historical rationalization
and make it history, only to lose the process of rationalization in the
sands of interpretation.
Feminist legal scholars have pointed to the American duty-to-rescue
rules as emblematic of a system that is based on a masculine ethic of lack
of care, support, and so on. 355 Here I have no occasion to agree or disagree with that proposition. Gender-correlated behavior, however, has
been remarkably important to the development of no-duty-to-rescue law.
When trespassing, criminal, miscreant, drunk, or foolish males ask for
assistance from problems they created, courts are still reluctant to require
another individual to affirmatively help them.

355. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 33-36 (1988); Martha Siegel, A Practitioner'sGuide to FeministJurisprudence,37-Ocr B. B.J. 6, 10-11 (1993).
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Expanding these cases into broad anti-humanitarian propositions is
inappropriate, particularly in an era when courts are divided on these
kind of cases. It is time to squarely address the underlying policy issues
that unite the miscreant male cases, and put an end to bad case law.

